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The Mediation Privilege's Transition
from Theory to Implementation:
Designing a Mediation Privilege
Standard to Protect Mediation
Participants, the Process and the
Public Interest
Alan Kirtley'
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation2 has become a widely utilized form of dispute resolution
Proponents of the process have long contended that the successful functioning of
mediation is dependent upon mediation proceedings being confidential." In the

1. Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Clinics, University of Washington School of Law;
B.A. and J.D., Indiana University (Bloomington). My interest in this subject arose out of my
participation in the drafting of Washington State's mediation privilege statute. The statute was a
project ofthe Alternative Dispute Resolution Section of the Washington State Bar Association. I thank
John Mitchell, Debbie Maranville, Tom Andrews, Ken Gallant, Lynne Cox and Rob Aronson for their
close and helpful readings, and Joe Lee for superb research assistance.
2. For a definition of "mediation" and a discussion of the process, see infra part II.
3. Compare ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution Directory
(1981) (141 programs listed) with ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution
Program Directory (1986-87) (listing over 300 programs). See also Kent L. Brown, Comment,
Confidentiality in Mediation: Status and Implications, J. DISP. RESOL. 307, 307 (1991); Lawrence
Freedman, Confidentialitya Closer Look in ABA SPEcIAL CoMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 47, 49 (Lawrence Freedman etat. eds.,

1985).
4.
See Brown, supra note 3, at 310; Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff,
Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 Oflo ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 37, 37-38
(1986); Eileen P. Friedman, Protectionof Confidentialityin the Mediation ofMinor Disputes, 11 CAP.
U. L. REV. 181, 196 (1982); Phillip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging
Administrative Settlements by Ensuring MediatorConfidentiality,41 ADMIN L.J. 315 (1989); Jonathan
M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17,
18 (1988); Kevin Gibson, Confidentialityin Mediation: A MoralReassessment, J. DiSP. REsOL. 25,
26 (1992) (Expressing that some degree of confidentiality may be required for mediation to be
effective, but it is wrong to assume absolute confidentiality is necessary); Timothy Hoxie, Note,
ProtectingConfidentialityin Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REv.441,444-45 (1984) ("Confidentiality fosters
an atmosphere of trust essential to mediation."); John R. Murphy III,
Note, In the Wake of Tarasoff.
Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, 35 CATH. U. L.REv. 209, 239-42 (1985); Note, Making Sense
of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural(ll)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L.
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last 15 years, despite a few opposing voices,' these urgings have materialized in
a profusion of mediation privilege statutes6 and rules.' The impetus for the

REV. 1339 (1992) (arguing for a limited "activities" privilege for mediation); Michael L. Prigoff,
Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1
(1988); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 145-46
(1989) (arguing for a narrowly drawn privilege); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic
Rationalesfor Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 388-91 (1994) (supporting a privilege that is "mutable
by private agreement").
5. Eric D. Green, A HereticalView of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
1 (1986). Cf NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND
THE LAW 67-71 (1987) (outlining the arguments of opponents to a mediation privilege).
6. Statutes dealing with community dispute resolution centers are referenced as "drc." ARiZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2238 (1994) (general), and 25-381.16 (1994) (divorce); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1297.371 (West Supp. 1994) (int'l commercial disputes); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.2 (West Supp.
1994) (general); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3177 (West Supp. 1994) (child custody); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC.
CODE § 54453 (West Supp. 1994) (labor disputes); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12984 (West Supp. 1994)
(housing discrimination) and 12985 (West 1992) (housing discrimination); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-43-205(2) (West 1994) (worker's comp.), 13-22-307 (WestSupp. 1993) (general), and 14-12-105
(West 1989) (marriage counseling); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153d (West Supp. 1994) (intergov't
dispute), 10-153f (West Supp. 1994) (labor dispute), 31-96 (West 1987) (labor dispute) and 46b-53(a)
(West Supp. 1994) (family law); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.101(3) (West Supp. 1994) (family), 44.102
(West Supp. 1994) (court ordered mediation), 44.201(5) (West Supp. 1994) (drc), 61.183 (West Supp.
1994) (divorce), 90.501 (West 1979) (evidence), 440.25(3)(b) (West 1991) (worker's compensation),
455.2235 (West Supp. 1994) (general), and 723.038(9) (West Supp. 1994) (mobile home park
tenancies); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 710 para 20/6 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (general); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 207.5-1-13 (Bums 1987) (labor disputes), and 31-1-24-7 (Bums 1992) (family law); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 13.14 (West Supp. 1994) (farm mediation), 22.7 (West Supp. 1989) (confidential records), 679A.12
(West 1987) (general); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-603 (1988) (domestic disputes) and 23-606 (1988)
(domestic disputes); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9:351 (West 1991) (child custody); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24 § 2857 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (mediation panels), tit. 26 §§ 965 (West 1988) (public
employee labor disputes), 1026 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (U of Me. labor disputes), and 1285 (West
1988 & Supp. 1993) (judicial employee labor disputes); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150, § 10A (West
Supp. 1994) (labor disputes), and ch. 223, § 23C (West 1986) (general); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
691.1557 (West 1991) (drc), 423.25a (West 1978) (labor mediation), and 552.513 (West 1988)
(domestic relations); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.02 (West 1990) (drc), 583.26 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994) (farm mediation), and 595.02 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (general); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014
(Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-811 (1993) (general), and 39-71-2410 (1993) (worker's
comp.); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2914 (1994) (general), 43-2908 (Supp. 1993) (child custody), and 48168(2)(b) (Supp. 1993) (worker's comp.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.109 (1991) (evidence); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 328-C:9 (Supp. 1993) (marital mediators), and 458:15-a (1992) (divorce); N.J. STAT..
ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West 1988) (labor disputes); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 915 (West 1992) (family court
conciliation) and N.Y. Jud. Law § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992) (drc); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(e)
(1993) (child custody); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 6-09.10-10 (Supp. 1993) (farm and business aid), 1409.1-06 (1991) (child custody), and 31-04-11 (Supp. 1993) (general); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1805 (West 1993) (general); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205 (1993) (general), 107.179 (1993) (child
custody), 107.600 (1993) (domestic relations-conciliation), and 107.785 (1993) (domestic relationsmediation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.34 (1992) (labor disputes); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19-44
(Supp. 1993) (general), and 15-5-29 (1988) (domestic relations); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-17-360 (Law.
Co-op. 1986) (employee grievance); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.053 (West Supp.
1994) (ADR procedures), and 154.073 (West Supp. 1994) (general); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
249-37 (West Supp. 1994) (int'l commercial disputes); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-17.1 (1989)
(divorce), and 78-31b-7 (1992) (general); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992) (general);
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mediation privilege has been to address the shortcomings of the existing law's
protection of mediation.8 These new rules of mediation privilege have emerged
despite Wigmore's venerated axiom that "the public has the right to every
[person's] evidence"9 and against the current of judicial resistance to court created
evidentiary privileges.'0

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5.60.070 (West Supp. 1994) (general), 7.75.050 (West 1992) (drc), and
26.09.015 (West Supp. 1994) (family); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.11 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (family
counseling), 904.085 (West Supp. 1994) (evidence); WYo. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Supp. 1994) (general);
5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994) (adr in the administrative process); 7 U.S.C. § 5101 (1994) (agricultural loan
program); 29 C.F.R. § 1208.5 (1994) (National Mediation Board).
Model mediation privilege statutes/rules have been suggested. A group of persons prominent
in the mediation field contributed to the development of a model mediation privilege provision.
Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 17, 71-73 (1988). The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution
also drafted a model provision for presentation to the ABA House of Delegates, but it has never been
adopted. Id. at 65-70.
7. ALA. CIVIL CT. MEDIATION RULE 11 (general); ARIz. MARICOPA COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULE
6.8 (domestic relations); ARiz. PIMA COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULE 18.7 (conciliation court); ARIz. PINAL
COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULE 4.2(e) (domestic relations); ARiz. YAVAPAI COUNTY SUPER. CT. RULE
10.1(E) (general); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-45, R. 408; IDAHO R. EVID. 507; FLA. WORK. COMP. PROC.
RULE 4.360; IND. ADR RULE 2.7 (general) and 2.12 (general); LA. STAT. ORLEANS CIV. DIST. CT.
RULE 18; MD. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS RULE S73A (child custody); MINN. 2ND JUD. DICT. CT. RULE
9.05 (family court); MINN. GEN. PRAC. RULE 310.05 (general); Mo. BAR RULE 17.06; MO. RULES OF
Civ. PRO. 88.08 (family); NEV. WASHOE COUNTY 2ND JuD. DIST. RULE 29 (family mediation
program); N.H. SUPER. CT. RULE 170 (general); N.J. GEN. APPL. RULE 1:33 (administrative
responsibility), and 1:40-4 (general); N.Y. CT. RULE § 116.3 (comm. disp. resol. program); OKLA.
COUNTY 7TH JuD. DIST. RULE 62 (general); TEx. 4TH DIST. CT. OF APPEALS RULE 8 (ADR); U.S.
BANKR. CT. S.D. CAL. RULE 7016-3 (mediation panels); U.S. BANKR. CT. M.D. FLA. RULE 2.7
(general); U.S. DIST CT. M.D. FLA. RULE 9.07 (court-annexed mediation); U.S. DIST. CT. MASS.
LOCAL RULE 16.4(C)(4)(f); U.S. DIST. CT. D. N.J. RULE 49 (general); U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. OKLA.
RULE 48 (general); U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. WASH. LOCAL RULE 39.1(d)(3); U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. WASH.
LOCAL RULE 39.1(c)(5) (general).
Note there is some question as to whether courts have the authority under FED. R. CIV. P. 83,
and its state counterparts, to promulgate local court rules creating a mediation privilege. Compare
ROGERS & MCEwEN, supranote 4, at 119, n.27, with Folberg, ConfidentialityandPrivilegein Divorce
Mediation, DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 319, 332 (1988). A separation of powers
issue may arise if a state's mediation privilege derived from a court rule conflicts with a statutory
disclosure requirement such as child abuse. Kenneth S. Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making Absent
Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 459-61 (1985).
8. See infra Part IV.
9.
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2192, at 70 (1961)
[hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].

10. People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (11. 1983), remanded,469 N.E.2d. 287 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) (expansion and creation of privileges should be left to the legislature); Matter of Parkway Manor
Health Care Crt., 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("In view of the longstanding judicial
State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
hostility toward evidentiary privileges .. ");
App. 1984) ("[P]rivileges in Florida are no longer creatures of judicial decision."); Drewitt v. Ranier
Sch., 806 P.2d 1260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Maxon, 756 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1988) (court
refused to create a parent-child privilege). See generally, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1984),

§ 75.
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Interestingly, these new privilege rules, despite their common purpose, vary
substantially in scope, content and operation. Frequently, the provisions reveal an
outright lack of understanding of the mediation process and do not address the
harms the privilege seeks to cure." These differences also reflect the difficulty
of creating a rule which strikes a proper balance between mediation's need for
confidentiality and the public's interest in access to certain types of information.
This article will analyze the developing law of the mediation privilege. To
begin with, the attributes and uses of the mediation process and the function of
confidentiality in mediation will be examined. The existing legal means to protect
mediation confidentiality, short of a privilege, will also be reviewed. Then an
analysis of policy considerations underlying evidentiary privileges generally will
be followed by an assessment of the theoretical underpinnings for a mediation
privilege. Finally, a critique of the various forms taken by new mediation
privilege statutes and rules will be undertaken. The State of Washington's
mediation privilege statute 2 will serve as a comparative benchmark throughout

ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 4, at 145-46.
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070 (Supp. 1994) reads as follows:
(1) If there is a court order to mediate, a written agreement between the parties to
mediate, or if mediation is mandated under RCW 7.70.100, then any communication made
or materials submitted in, or in connection with, the mediation proceeding, whether made
or submitted to or by the mediator, a mediation organization, a party, or any person
present, are privileged and confidential and are not subject to disclosure in any judicial
or administrative proceeding except:
(a) When all parties to the mediation agree, in writing, to disclosure;
(b) When the written materials or tangible evidence are otherwise subject to
discovery, and were not prepared specifically for use in and actually used in the mediation
proceeding;
(c) When a written agreement to mediate permits disclosure;
(d) When disclosure is mandated by statute;
(e) When the written materials consist of a written settlement agreement or
other agreement signed by the parties resulting from a mediation proceeding;
(f) When those communications or written materials pertain solely to
administrative matters incidental to the mediation proceeding, including the agreement to
mediate; or
(g) In a subsequent action between the mediator and a party to the mediation
arising out of the mediation.
(2) When there is a court order, a written agreement to mediate, or when mediation
is mandated under RCW 7.70.100, as described in subsection (1) of this section, the
mediator or a representative of a mediation organization shall not testify in any judicial
or administrative proceeding unless:
(a) All parties to the mediation and the mediator agree in writing; or
(b) In an action described in subsection (1)(g) of this section.

11.
12.

WASH. REV.

CODE

§ 5.60.072 (Supp 1994) reads as follows:

Notwithstanding the provisions of RCW § 5.60.070, when any party participates in mediation
conducted by a state or federal agency under the provisions of a collective bargaining law or
similar statute, the agency's rules govem questions of privilege and confidentiality.
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the article. While not perfect, the Washington statute presents a considered
approach to many of the scope, content and operational issues that will be
discussed. The purposes of this article are to contribute to a clearer understanding
of the workings (and non-workings) of individual mediation privilege provisions
and to the thoughtful development of the mediation privilege.
II. THE MEDIATION PROCESS
Many have defined "mediation."'" At its essence, mediation is a process 4
of negotiations facilitated by a third person(s) who assists disputants to pursue a
mutually agreeable settlement of their conflict. 5 In contrast to adjudicatory

The Washington statute draws heavily upon earlier privilege statutes from Virginia and Oregon.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.205 (1993). Washington also
has enacted mediation privilege provisions for community dispute resolution centers and domestic
relations mediations. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.015(3) (Supp.
1994).
13. FLA. STAT. ANN § 44.1011(2) (West Supp. 1994) ("Mediation means a process whereby a
neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of a dispute
between two or more parties."); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. .§ 154.023 (West 1991)
("Mediation is a forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates communication between
parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding among them."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.21 (Michie 1991) ("'Mediation' means the process by which a mediator assists and facilitates two
or more parties to a controversy in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution of the controversy ....);
Gerald W. Cormick, The "Theory" and Practice of Environmental Mediation, 2 ENvTL. PROF. 24, 27
(1980) (quoting the Office of Environmental Mediation's definition of mediation as a "voluntary
process in which those involved in a dispute jointly explore and reconcile their differences. The
mediator has no authority to impose a settlement."); Comment, Mediation and Medical Malpractice
Disputes: Potential Obstacles in the TraditionalLawyer's Perspective, J. DISP. RESOL. 371, 373
(1990) (Mediation is "a voluntary process in which a neutral third party, who lacks authority to impose
a solution, helps participants reach their own agreement for resolving a dispute or planning a
transaction."); Joint Committee on Standards of Conduct: American Arbitration Association, American
Bar Association & Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Standards of ConductforMediators,
p. 2 (Final Draft April 8, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Joint Committee Standards]
("Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party -- a mediator -- facilitates the resolution of
a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement (or 'self-determination') by the parties to the dispute.").
14. Brown, supra note 3, at 309 ("Mediation is a communication process; solving legal problems
is simply a by product."); R. Kraybill, A Procedure for Mediation Inter-Personal Disputes, in
MEDIATION: A READER (L. Buzzard & R. Kraybill eds., 1982). Given the informal nature and varied
uses of mediation, the process takes on distinct forms in various settings. Nevertheless, a mediation
generally proceeds through these stages: a mediator opening to explain the process (and reach an
understanding regarding confidentiality); participant statements to offer their perspectives on the
dispute; agenda building to define and organize the negotiations; negotiations in joint and/or private
caucus sessions; and closure to clarify the terms of the agreement reached or explore next steps for the
parties if resolution cannot be achieved.
15. While resolving existing disputes has been and is the predominate function of mediation, a
growing use of mediation is for the negotiation of future relationships and transactions. Comment,
supra note 13. For example, mediators assist prospective business partners plan and negotiate the
terms of their transaction. Also, administrative agencies and stakeholders mediate the terms of
proposed regulatipns to minimize litigation over the new rules. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994); Philip
J. Harter, Negotiated Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982).
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forms of dispute resolution -- hearings, arbitration and trials -- mediation is a
contractarian process.' 6 The salient features of mediation are an informal
process, 17 a neutral mediator 8 without authority to command a result,'9
disputants who participate voluntarily 0 and settle of their own accord,2' and
pertinent to our purposes, confidentiality of mediation communications.

16. Hoxie, supra note 4, at 443.
17. Mediation is also flexible. The informality and flexibility of mediation allow the parties and
the mediator to custom make a process for the parties' dispute.
18. "Self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation
process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Any party may
withdraw from the mediation at any time." Joint Committee Standards, supra note 13, at 2. "In
mediation, decision making authority rest with the parties. The role of the mediator includes, but is
not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying issues, fostering joint problem-solving, and exploring
settlement alternatives." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011(2) (West Supp. 1994). One author wrote:
The need for impartiality and neutrality does not mean that a mediator may not have
personal opinions about a dispute's outcome. No one can be entirely impartial. What
impartiality and neutrality do signify is that the mediator can separate his or her opinions
about the outcome of the dispute from the desires of the disputants and focus on ways to
help the parties make their own decisions without unduly favoring one of them. The final
test of impartiality and neutrality of the mediator ultimately rests with the parties. They
must perceive that the intervenor is not overtly partial or unneutral in order to accept his
or her assistance.
CHRJSTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING
CONFLICT

15 (1986).

19. In theory a party loses no control over the outcome of the dispute by mediating because the
mediator is a facilitator of negotiations, not a decision maker. E.g., TEX. Civ. PAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 154.023(b) (West Supp. 1994) ("A mediator may not impose his own judgment on the issues
for that of the parties."). Even those mediators whose methods include suggesting particular outcomes
have no overt authority to impose a specific settlement. Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice
of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 91 (1981). However, a mediation
participant is likely to experience some, at least subtle, pressure to settle: pressure from the process,
the mediator and/or the other party. For persons physically or emotionally incapable of withstanding
such pressure, mediation is inappropriate. See infra,note 38 regarding the questionable appropriateness
of mediating disputes between victims of abuse and their abusers.
20. "Participation in the dispute resolution process shall be voluntary and the form or technique
utilized shall be by mutual agreement of the parties." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1556 (West
Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(3) (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1804(A) (1993).
Normally, participation in mediation is completely voluntary: both coming to and remaining at
the mediation. Increasingly, statutes and contractual clauses mandate that parties mediate, for example,
in child custody disputes. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.184(3) (Supp. 1994) (post-decree ADR
required). While appearing at the mediation table may be mandatory, in only a few contexts, such as
labor disputes, is continuing participation legally required. In the labor field, parties often have a duty
to stay at the table and bargain "in good faith."
21.
"[Mediation] is an informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the
disputing parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
44.1011(2) (West Supp. 1994); see also Brown, supra note 3, at 309 ("Mediators may give advice and
structure discussions, but whatever they do is directed toward achieving a durable agreement which
is acceptable to both parties.").
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Mediation has its origins in prelegal societies around the world.22 Mediation
also has a long history in the American colonies and the United States.23 Wide
24
scale use of mediation in this country first occurred in the labor field, resulting
in 1947. 21
Service
in the creation of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Community programs to conciliate minor disputes and crimes were first developed
in the 1920's. 26 In the 1960's, mediation was used by the Community Relations
Service of the U.S. Justice Department in civil rights disputes.27 Beginning in
have been touted as the preferred processes
the 1970's, mediation and conciliation
2
to resolve family disputes.
From these beginnings, mediation is now widely used to resolve a broad
range of conflicts: from playground squabbles 29 to multi-party, international
disputes.30 Regularly mediated cases involve personal injuries, business disputes,
divorce and child custody, the environment, criminal cases, farm foreclosures, and
civil rights matters.3 A few jurisdictions have instituted so-called multi-door
courthouse programs placing access to alternative dispute resolution processes on
an equal par with trials32 and others mandate mediation of all civil court cases.33
As a result of these developments, mediation is increasingly an alternative to the
traditional justice system or at least a regular detour off the litigation trail.
Mediation's growth in popularity stems from its attractiveness to disputing parties
and its effectiveness in bringing about settlements. 4

P.H. GULLIVER, DISPuTES AND NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979);
22.
HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW (1965); Glassman, The Function of Mediation in
China: Examiningthe Impact ofRegulations Governing the People'sMediation Committees, 10 UCLA
PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 460 (1992). See generally MOORE, supra note 18, at 19-21.
23.

Id; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 19-46 (1983); Hoxie, supra note 4, at

446 n.38.
24. MOORE, supra note 18, at 21; Hoxie, supra note 4, at 442.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1982).
26. R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 63 (3d ed. 1924); Merlin H. Staring, Note, Conciliation
in the Municipal Courtfor the District of Columbia, 34 GEO. L.J. 352 (1946).
MOORE, supra note 18, at 21-22. The Community Relations Service was created by
27.
Congress as a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(d) (1981).
JAY FOLBERG & ANN MILNE, DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-16 (1988).
28.
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.600 (1993).
29.

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND

OTHER PROCESSES 10 (2nd ed. 1992). Dispute resolution is part of Michigan's compulsory school
curriculum. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1167 (Supp. 1994)..

30.

M. Scott Donahey, InternationalMediationandConciliation, in THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE, Chap. 33 (Bette J. Roth et al.eds., 1993).

31.
See generally Green, supra note 5, at 2-4 nn.4-10 (listing the various settings in which
mediation is used).
32. GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 432-33, 438-41.
33. Florida has mandatory mediation of civil cases in its highest trial court. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.102(2) (West 1991).
34.
Mediation has proven to be highly effective. While data are limited, one study found that
66.1% of the small claims cases mediated ended in an agreement. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION
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Mediation is user-friendly. Legal rules of procedure and evidence do not
apply, witnesses are not called, attorneys often are not present, there are no limits
on what information may be presented, no record is made and settlements need not
be confined to strictly legal remedies.3" Because of its informality mediation is
a faster, cheaper 6 and less adversarial method of resolving disputes than
traditional legal proceedings. 7 This informality is not without its risks.3"
III. THE FUNCTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION
Having no coercive power, a mediator is dependant upon increasing
communication, if not trust, between disputants.39 The willingness of mediation
parties to "open up" is essential to the success of the process.40

RESEARCH (Kenneth Kressel et al.
eds., 1989). Extrapolations from this study are imprudent. Before
mediation became popular, 90 to 95% of all civil cases settled before trial. Thus it is difficult to
quantify mediation's "added value." Cf Brown & Ayres, supra note 4. The predominate benefit of
mediation is the savings of transactions costs through earlier settlements; mediation can result in
settlements before cases are filed or earlier in the litigation process.
The perceived success of mediation in bringing about settlements has caused mediation to
become a popular form of dispute resolution. Business agreements contain mediation clauses and new
legislation often provides for or requires mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism. Provision of
mediation services is a growth industry. Public resources are being devoted to court connected
mediation programs. Private, non-profit organizations have sprung up to supply volunteer mediators
for small claims and community conflicts.. And, a host of private firms, many new, compete to offer
mediation services for a fee. For many, mediation has become the attractive alternative to the
courtroom.
35. MOORE, supra note 18, at 13-19.
36.
A 1987 newspaper article reported that the Travelers Corporation, a large insurance
company, had settled 2,700 casualty claims using ADR during the preceding 18 months with estimated
savings of $2.7 million. Alexander Stille, ADR Helps Cut Costs, Survey Says, NAT'L LAW J., at 9
(Aug. 31, 1987).
37. A third party mediator can create value in negotiations by overcoming barriers inherent even
in the strategic interaction of rational, self-interested negotiators. Brown & Ayres, supra note 4.
38. Prejudice or power imbalances may arise in mediation which formal legal procedures are
designed to curb. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1075-78, 1082-85 (1984)
(arguing generally in favor of public dispute resolution); Owen M. Fiss, Out ofEden, 94 YALE U.
1669, 1672-73 (1985); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985) (arguing that ADR processes
may foster racial and ethnic prejudice because, as shown by social science research, people who hold
prejudicial attitudes are more likely to express and act upon them in informal settings.).
Many have concluded that mediation is not appropriate where there is a history of domestic
abuse or violence. Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Law Mediation and the Role of the
Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 717 (1993); Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory
Divorce Mediationfor Battered Women, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 272 (1992); Charlotte Germane, et
al.,
Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Dangersfor Victims
of Domestic Violence, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. 175 (1986).
39. Prigoff, supra note 4, at 1-2; Hoxie, supra note 4, at 444-45.
40. The Wisconsin mediation privilege begins with this language: "The purpose of this section
is to encourage the candor and cooperation of disputing parties, to the end that disputes may be
quickly, fairly and voluntarily settled." WIs. STAT. § 904.085(l) (West 1994); Brown, supra note 3,
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The mediation process is purposefully informal to encourage a broad ranging
discussion of facts, feelings, issues, underlying interests4' and possible solutions
to the parties' conflict.42 Mediation's private setting43 invites parties to speak
In addition, mediators often hold private
openly, with complete candor."
meetings -- "caucuses" -- with each of the parties." More overt assurances of
confidentiality are common. Mediators regularly require all present to promise to
keep mediation discussions confidential,46 and routinely assure participants that
47
the proceedings are confidential (whether or not legal protection is certain).
Under such circumstances, mediation parties often reveal personal and
business secrets, share deep-seated feelings about others, and make admissions of
fact and law.48 Without adequate legal protection, a party's candor in mediation

at 110 ("... parties must be free to advance possible solutions without fear that these solutions will later
be used against them or bind them if they prove unsatisfactory.") citing Local 808, Building
Maintenance, Service and Railroad Workers v. National Mediation Board, 888 F.2d 1428, 1436 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to ProfessorSusskind,
6 Vt. L. Rev. 85, 96-97 (1981).
41. The idea of encouraging parties to negotiate based on their underlying interests, rather than
positions, was popularized in GETTING TO YES. ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES
3-8, 41-57 (1981).
A mediation agreement can resolve the parties' dispute, and in addition, create a structure
42.
for conflict avoidance in their future interactions. Brown, supra note 3, at 309 ("Perhaps the most
significant difference between mediation and adjudication is that mediation often structures future
relationships between the parties, something for which adjudication is ill-suited.").
43.
Mediations between private parties are generally conducted in a private confidential setting.
Mediations involving public issues raise special concerns which are beyond the scope of this article.
Compare Will Pryor & Robert M. O'Boyle, Public Policy ADR: Confidentiality in Conflict?, 46
S.M.U. L. REv. 2207 (1993) (arguing in favor of private, confidential, non-binding mediation of public
disputes) with Thomas S. Leatherbury & Mark A. Cover, Keeping Public MediationPublic: Exploring
the Conflict Between ConfidentialMediation and Open Government, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 2221 (1993).
44. Disclosures made in such settings create reasonable expectations of confidentiality. Brown,
supra note 3, at 311 ("Perhaps mediators do not overtly make such blanket promises [of
confidentiality], but the parties may justifiably draw such conclasions from the conduct of the
mediator.").
45.
In caucus discussions the mediator seeks to discover a party's private factual information,
underlying interests and negotiation strategies in order to better understand the dynamics of the conflict.
The confidentiality of caucuses is the essential motivator for a party to make such disclosures. Id. at
309-11. "The very nature of a caucus between one party and the mediator justifies the inference that
the mediator will not disclose the information to the other party without permission." Id. at 311.
Moore, supra note 18, at 263-71. Cf Brown & Ayres, supra note 4, as to the beginning implications
of mediations using private caucusing exclusively.
Such requests increase the disputants' sense of confidentiality since most persons assume
46.
that promises made will be honored. Brown, supra note 3, at 311. "The mediator's assurances of
confidentiality lead to the parties' active participation in the mediation process." Friedman, supra note
4, at 197.
47. Many programs simply assume that mediation communications are privileged. Freedman,
supra note 4, at 42 (referring to an ABA survey of dispute resolution programs).
Brown, supra note 3, at 310 ("Confidentiality is vitally important to mediation because it
48.
facilitates disclosure. People will not disclose personal needs, strategies, and information if they feel
it might be used against them."); see also Prigoff, supra note 4, at 1-2.
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might well be "rewarded" by a discovery request or the revelation of mediation
information at trial.49 A principal purpose of the mediation privilege is to
provide mediation parties protection against these downside risks of a failed
mediation.5" Participation will diminish if perceptions of confidentiality are not
matched by reality.5 Another critical purpose of the privilege is to maintain the
public's perception that individual mediators and the mediation process are neutral
and unbiased.52
IV.

THE INADEQUACY OF PROTECTION
UNDER NON-PRIVILEGE LAW

Before the widespread enactment of mediation privilege statutes, several nonprivilege theories were advanced to address the need for confidentiality in
mediation. Contract and evidence law were relied upon. The few cases protecting
mediation communication, however, have done so principally by finding an
intended privilege in underlying legislation." These theories and cases afford
limited and uncertain protection for mediation communications.
Their
shortcomings serve to highlight the need for an evidentiary privilege. 4
A. Contract Theory
At the behest of the mediator, participants regularly begin mediation by
agreeing to hold all communications confidential. Often written agreements55 to
mediate are signed specifying, among other things, that parties will not reveal
mediation information, the mediator cannot be subpoenaed and any exceptions to
confidentiality.56
While such agreements may create expectations of
confidentiality their enforceability is problematic. Because the law views courts
as entitled to "every [person]'s evidence,"57 public policy forbids contracting to

49.

Hoxie, supra note 4, at 445; see infra
Part IV.

50.
51.
52.

Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 4, at 42-43.
Id. at 37, 42; ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 100.
See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.

53.
See infra section IV C.
54. Indeed the justification for a mediation privilege is expanded or diminished by the extent
to which mediation confidentiality can be protected under other law.
55. For sample agreement forms, see CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOuRCES, CPR PRACTICE GUIDE:
CONFIDENTIALITY INADR, BI-B25 (1989).
56. This is especially true when the dispute is of the type likely to be litigated if not settled
or
it is a case that has already been filed in court. Practice standards for lawyer-mediators in family law
matters encourage mediators to obtain written agreements barring mediator disclosures. ABA
Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, II A. Also, many community dispute
resolution centers require their volunteer mediators to obtain written agreements to mediate that include
a confidentiality provision. However, use of written mediation agreements is not universal. See infra
notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
57. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at § 2192, at 70 (the original reads every "man's"
evidence).
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exclude evidence.5" Agreements between individuals are not permitted to restrict
the court's access to testimony in its pursuit of justice. 9 As a result, mediation
participants are ill advised to rely on contract theory as a means of preserving
mediation confidentiality. 0 Moreover, mediation confidentiality agreements,
even if enforceable as against those signing, are likely not to restrict third-party
access to mediation information. 61 For example, in a chain reaction automobile
accident involving multiple parties, those choosing to mediate face the potential
of having their mediation discussions discovered and admitted at trial by nonmediating drivers.
Contract theory offers little to those interested in broadly protecting
mediation communications. By enacting a mediation privilege, jurisdictions can
create an explicit exception to the policy against exclusion of evidence. The
universal applicability of a privilege addresses the contract theory's inability to
affect third party behavior.

B. Evidence Theory
Evidence law is another potential source of protection for mediation
Traditionally, evidence law has excluded evidence of
communications.
compromise negotiations:62 "I'll give you $80,000 to bring this to a close today."
Underlying the rule is a strong social policy of encouraging negotiated settlements

58.

Id.at § 2194b.

59. Id.
60. State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("The record reflects
no authority for the mediator's statement that the parties' communications were confidential. The fact
that he may have so advised the parties that their communications would be held confidential does not
now excuse him from being compelled by [the defendant] to testify concerning what was said."). Cf
United States v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 124 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (press was entitled to
discovery documents in anti-trust probe despite confidentiality clause in settlement agreement between
the federal government and the utility); see also Brown, supranote 3, at 318-323; Freedman & Prigoff,
supra note 4, at 41; Friedman, supra note 4, at 203 (confidentiality agreements in mediation of
criminal cases agreed to by prosecutors are clearly unenforceable legally); Hoxie, supra note 4, at 45051. But see C.R. & S.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (priest accused of child
molestation granted preliminary injunction enjoining child's parents from disclosing information from
med/arb. proceeding); Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (CL App. 1965) (upholding
confidentiality agreement between a rabbi and a couple seeking marriage counseling as a matter of
public policy). See also Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 1026-29 (1988) (presenting a more sanguine view as to the enforceability of
confidentiality agreements); ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 136-37 (same).
61. See Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (allowing discovery by a third party notwithstanding an agreement between the litigating parties
to hold specified information confidential); Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d
532, 538 (2nd Cir. 1974) (ordering disclosure of trade secrets covered by confidentiality agreement).
Cf Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. Anchorage Daily News, 779 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1989) (public records
disclosure statute applied to school district settlement containing confidentiality clause).
62. WIGMORF ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at § 1061(a), 34; CHARLES TILFORD McCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 274 (3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
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of disputes.63 The operating premise is that negotiation discussions are not
reliable evidence to resolve questions of damages or liability.' As a form of
negotiation, mediation discussions arguably fall under this rule.65 However, the
rule's limited scope and uncertain application leave mediation communications
vulnerable to discovery and disclosure at trial.
Early cases restricted the
exclusion of negotiation discussions to the specific terms of the offer of
compromise,66 and allowed introduction of admissions of facts.67 A generation
of controversy, and cases, followed as to whether a particular statement was within
or outside the rule's ambit.68 Of particular difficulty were so called "intertwined"
statements containing elements of settlement propositions and admissions: "Since
the valves may have been weak, I'll knock 25% off the original sales price."69
Federal Rule of Evidence 408,70 and its state counterparts, 71 have attempted to

63. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 811.
64. Advisory Committee's Note in FED. R. EVID. 408. However, as the offer of compromise
approaches the amount claimed, the relevancy of the information increases and the basis for its
exclusion is lessened. Also, given the competitive nature of most negotiations, admissions of liability
would not be made facetiously. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 68 which disallows evidence of an unaccepted
offer of judgment in a proceeding to determine costs.
65.
A few local counterparts of FED. R. EVID. 408, which excludes evidence of offers to
compromise, expressly include mediation discussions. See HAw.REV.STAT. § 626-1; HAw. R. EvID.
408 ("Evidence of... (3) mediation or attempts to mediate a claim which was in dispute, is not
admissible ....");
IDAHO R. EVID. 408 ("Compromise negotiations encompass mediation."); ME. R.
EVID. 408(1) & (2); Rule 16.4(C)(4)(f) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
District of Mass. (mediation discussions are "confidential communication to the full extent
contemplated by Fed. R. Evid. 408.").
66. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 1061 at 36; George M. Bell, Admissions Arising
out of Compromise -- Are They Irrelevant?, 31 TEX. L. REV. 239, 241 (1953); Green, supra note 5,
at 15-16.
67. See Advisory Committee's Note in FED. R. EVID. 408 ("The practical value of the common
law rule has been greatly diminished by its inapplicability to admissions of fact, even though made in
the course of compromise negotiations, unless hypothetical, stated to be 'without prejudice,' or so
connected with the offer as to be inseparable from it").
68.
Id; Note, supra note 4, at 447-48; ROGERS & MCEwEN, supra note 4, at 103.
69. Id.at 103.
70. Federal Rule of Evidence 408, dealing with "Compromise and Offers to Compromise," states:
Evidence of(l) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. The rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
71.
A majority of the states have adopted an evidence rule analogous to Federal Rule of
Evidence 408. States adopting such a rule are noted in 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 408[08] (1986). States which have not adopted a Rule 408 equivalent retained the
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put controversy to rest by expanding the scope of the exclusion to "include
evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations, as well as the
offer or completed compromise itself." 2 Evidence Rule 408's weakness is that
it does not require exclusion of evidence from a negotiation offered for "another
purpose," such as, to prove bias or prejudice of a witness, to negate a contention
of undue delay, or to prove an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution. 3 Since mediation discussions tend to be free flowing and often
unguarded, revelations later serving as impeachment,7 4 bias or "another purpose"
evidence are likely. 5 The "another purpose" clause in the hands of creative
counsel leaves little in mediation definitely exempt from disclosure. 6
An additional significant limitation of Rule 408 is the fact that the rule offers
no protection against discovery of mediation discussions.77 Only privileged
Thus, Rule 408 leaves mediation
information is exempt from discovery."
participants open to demands of a party to the mediation or a third party for
discovery of the substance of an entire mediation proceeding in an effort to obtain
leads to admissible evidence.79 Also, Rule 408 does not bar admission of
evidence from negotiation in proceedings not governed by the rules of evidence:
administrative hearings, miscellaneous criminal hearings80 or criminal cases.8"
Rule 408's shortcomings in protecting mediation communications provide
justification for a mediation privilege and suggest its design. 2 A mediation

narrower common law rule and its problems. See ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 104.
72. Advisory Committee's Note in FED. R. EVID. 408.
73. For text of FED. R. EVID. 408, see supra, note 70.
74.
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 753 P.2d 1253 (Idaho 1987) (held that statements made in
negotiations could be used to impeach trial testimony).
75.
Brown, supra note 3, at 313; see ROGER & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 108-09 (listing
examples of evidence from negotiations offered for "another purpose").
76. Brazil, supra note 60, at 966-82.
77. A party may discover information that may be inadmissible at trial under Rule 408, so long
as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
78. "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged .. " FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).
79.
ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 110 n.82; Brown, supra note 3, at 314.
80. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (held Florida's
81.
Evidence Rule 408 inapplicable to alleged threats made in mediation by the victim of a later crime to
his alleged assailant). Rule 408 does not apply to the negotiation of a claim that later is the subject
of a criminal trial. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 4, at 106-7. In the same vein, FEDERAL RULE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (e)(6), generally excluding plea bargain negotiations, does not by its terms
cover mediation. As a result, statements by the accused or admissions contained in the settlement
agreement could be used as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Brown, supra note 3, at
314.
Compare Harter, supra note 4, at 348-56 (arguing for fuller protection of mediation after
82.
concluding that protection under Rule 408 is inadequate) and Hoxie, supra note 4, at 449-50, 457-59
(same) with Green, supra note 5, at 35-36 (arguing for protection of mediators under slightly expanded
version of Rule 408).
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privilege should be of broad unambiguous scope, bar discovery, and exclude
evidence in all types of proceedings.83
C. Common Law
In nearly all cases in which a mediation privilege has been found, the court
has relied heavily. on the existence of a strong legislative policy supporting
confidentiality for mediation. 4 Few examples exist where mediation discussions
have been held to be privileged in the absence of such a legislative mandate.8"
Courts are reluctant to shield mediation in the absence of protective legislation. 6
This is not surprising given courts' current resistance to establishing new
privileges.87
Although early cases, particularly Macaluso,8s have provided
critical support for the evolving mediation privilege, the common law has not been
the dominant force in the privilege's growth. As we shall see, that growth has
been largely legislatively driven.89

83. See infra part VI for a discussion of these issues.
84. The prototypical case is N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 53-56 (9th Cir.
1980). In Macaluso, the court interpreted the statute and regulations governing the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Services as necessitating a privilege for mediators to insure the continued usefulness
of the FMCS in future disputes. Id. See also Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C.
1981), affid, 459 U.S. 159 (1982) (privilege for Community Relations Service mediator); Wilson v.
Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1245 (11 th Cir. 1985), rev. denied, 764 F.2d 1411 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same);
People v. Reyes, 816 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.Cal. 1992) (same); Lake Utopia Paper, Ltd. v. Connelly
Containers, Inc. 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980) (holding that
confidentiality of federal Civil Appeal Management Plan pre-argument conferences discussions was
essential to the proper functioning of the Plan). Several courts creating a common law privilege did
so in the interim between passage and the effective date of a mediation privilege statute. Sonenstahl
v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (privilege recognized for labor mediator);
Cohen v. Cohen, 290 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (privilege for divorce conciliation). But see
State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to create common law
privilege, even though privilege statute had been enacted after the mediation, because authority to
create privileges was vested in the legislature). Cf. United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 103
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that statements made during mediation/arbitration entered into voluntarily
were inadmissible in federal prosecution. The federal district court believed itself not to be bound by
New York's mediation privilege statute, but gave it weight in balancing policy considerations.).
85. Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that accused's admissions during
court ordered mediation were not admissible during subsequent prosecution for theft on grounds of
public policy).
Cf Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. App. Ct. 1965) (marital
counseling/conciliation with rabbi was confidential).
86. In Castellano,460 So.2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1984) the court, in the absence of a state
statute, required a mediator to testify as to alleged threats by victim during mediation in support of
defendant's self-defense claim in an attempted murder case. It should be noted that in such cases even
if there were a mediation privilege, the criminally accused person's constitutional right to present a
defense may well override the privilege. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
87. For cited authorities see supra, note 10.
88. 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
89. See infra Part VI.
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V. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF THE MEDIATION PRIVILEGE

The response of many jurisdictions to the shortcomings of existing law has
been to enact9" or promulgate 9' rules of mediation privilege. Undoubtedly, the
rules reflect policy decisions to nurture a process that settles disputes in a nonadversarial manner and protects participants from the risks of a failed
mediation.92
By their sheer numbers, these provisions evidence a widely shared conclusion
that any social costs associated with a mediation privilege are outweighed by the
privilege's benefits. While it is unlikely jurisdictions arrived at this conclusion
through penetrating analysis of the legal theories underlying evidentiary privileges,
analysis of those theories as they apply to mediation provides an important, final
backdrop to a review of the scope, content and operation issues raised by
individual mediation privilege provisions.93
The traditional rationale for evidentiary privileges is that public policy
requires the encouragement of confidential communications within certain special
relationships without which these relationships cannot be effective.9" These
relationships are viewed as having sufficient social importance to justify some
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.95
This utilitarian justification for evidentiary privileges is best exemplified in
Wigmore's traditional test for recognizing a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered; and

90.

See listing of statutes supra, note 6.

91.

See listing of court rules supra, note 7.

92. Since only limited state legislative history exists, it is difficult to determine what motivated
aparticular jurisdiction's decision to enact amediation privilege. However, several mediation privilege
provisions begin with a purpose statement. The 1994 Supplemental Judicial Council Note to the
Wisconsin privilege states: "The purpose of the rule is to encourage the parties to explore facilitated
settlement of disputes without fear that their claims or defenses will be compromised if mediation fails
and the dispute'is later litigated." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West Supp. 1994); see also WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.015(1) (Supp. 1994) ("The purpose of the mediation proceeding shall be to reduce
acrimony which may exist between the parties and to develop an agreement assuring the child's close
and continuing contact with both parents after the marriage is dissolved.").
93.
94.

See infra Part VI.
McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 171.

95.

Id.
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(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of the litigation.96
As to the first factor, we have seen that mediation predominately occurs in
private settings and under circumstances in which the participants have agreed not
to disclose their communications." Moreover, it is likely the mediator will have
told the parties their discussions are confidential.98 Those who have mediated
know that the exchange of never before disclosed information is commonplace in
mediation. Mediation would suffer if the parties had to be wary of what they said
for fear of disclosure by other participants. Wigmore's first condition is present
for communications occurring during mediation.
As to the second factor, the overwhelming weight of scholarly authority
supports the proposition that confidentiality is essential to the functioning of
mediation.99 When asked to protect mediation communications in the absence
of a privilege statute, nearly all courts have done so based upon a recognition of
the critical role confidentiality plays in the functioning of the mediation
process."t o However, critics of the mediation privilege point out that mediation
flourished without the protection of a privilege.' ° Mediation succeeded without
privilege protection because parties honored commitments, for the most part, to
keep mediation discussions confidential. And in cases when compelled disclosure
has been sought the courts have generally maintained confidentiality.'0 2 Such
results from the courts are, however, not assured without legislation upholding
mediation confidentiality.10 3

96. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at § 2285 (emphasis found in the original text).
97. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
99. See authorities cited supra note 4.
100. See supranotes 83-84 and accompanying text; infra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
101.
See Green, supra note 5, at 32. Cf ROGERs & SALEM, supra note 5, at 67-68. With
privileges in general, it has been suggested that there is little evidence as to the effect of the existence
of a privilege on communications. Comment, Developments in the Law: PrivilegedCommunication,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1474 (1985). However, although most are unaware of privilege rules and
their legal effect, one study has shown that a group at the margin- 25*/--30% -understand that certain
communications would be privileged. Id. at 1475. Since mediators regularly explain the concept of
confidentiality, it is likely parties understand and act upon the fact that mediation communications are
to be kept private.
The author is aware of anecdotal evidence of the effect of confidentiality upon mediation
communications. In the mediation of criminal matters, accused persons are often reluctant to discuss
the facts or take any responsibility for the incident. When urged to open up, the most common
response of the accused person is fear that what is said will be used against her or him in court After
further explanation of the meaning of confidentiality, such persons tend to open up, be willing to admit
wrongdoing and take responsibility for their actions. Without the existence of a privilege, mediation
in this context could not succeed. Accord Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300, 302 (Ga. App. Ct. 1988).
102. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
103. State v. Castellano, 460 So.2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) holding that there was no
basis for preventing compelled testimony of a mediator in the absence of legislation. "Ifconfidentiality
is essential to the success of the [mediation] program, the legislature is the proper branch of
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For those states considering a mediation privilege, the best evidence of public
opinion as to whether mediation relationships ought to be fostered is the flurry of4
legislative and court rule activity creating mediation privileges in sister states.1
Also, as stated above the scholarly community supports the mediation
privilege.' °5 Condition three of Wigmore's test is met.
The fourth condition requires a cost/benefit analysis. Under Wigmore's test
the loss to mediation communications through disclosures must be greater than the
06
The
gain of having mediation information available to the justice system.'
difficulty with Wigmore's "empirical" approach is the need to measure the
While fraught with empirical indeterminacy, the approach
unmeasurable.' 7
does establish a general framework for assessing the relative merits of a particular
privilege.'0 8
Candor is the dynamo that drives mediation. For mediation parties to speak
freely their communications must be protected from disclosure. Mediation
communications will be chilled if they become available to later discovery or
9
admissibility in evidence. The risk of participating simply becomes too high."
Parties will be dissuaded from mediating or, at a minimum, their candor in
mediation discussions will be curbed. Legally unrepresented participants will be
particularly vulnerable to having a mediation session used as a discovery
device." 0 All these results represent substantial injury to the mediation process.
A mediation privilege will result in some loss of evidence to the justice
system. The evidence lost will be information not already barred by existing law.
For example, those mediation discussions which are not excludable under Evidence
Rule 408. However, the cost of the mediation privilege is not necessarily equal
to the value of the evidence privileged by it."' Information that is disclosed in
mediation only because of the existence of a privilege cannot be counted as a cost;
"but for" the privilege the information would be unknown. An individual who
may disclose in the confidential atmosphere of mediation that he has evaded

government from which to obtain the necessary protection." Id at 482.
104. No survey data exists regarding views toward mediation confidentiality. In fact, many
citizens on the street may not yet be familiar with the mediation process. But the fact that their
legislative representatives and judicial officers in so many jurisdictions have created mediation privilege
provisions is strong evidence of "community" support for the privilege.
105. See supra, note 4.
106. By placing the burden ofjustification on proponents of a new privilege, Wigmore's balance
test has had the effect of curbing the development of new privileges. Comment, supra note 101, at
1479-80.
107. Id. at 1474-75.
108. Id.at 1473-74.
109. ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, at 99.
Prigoff, supra note 4, at 2. Many "choose" mediation over other forms of dispute
110.
resolution because of cost considerations. Mediation may be the only affordable means to resolve their
dispute given the soaring cost of legal services and the limited availability of free legal services. It
is especially unfair to subject unrepresented persons to having their mediation communications
available as evidence in a later proceeding. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 4, at 99.
111.
Comment, supra note 101, at 1477.
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income taxes, written bad checks, or falsified an insurance claim is unlikely to
voluntarily share that information with the justice system. Furthermore, the impact
of a mediation privilege on the "correct disposal of the litigation" can be
minimized through carefully drawn exceptions and waivers." 2 For example, an
exception allowing for discovery of facts and material that existed prior to the
mediation tempers the privilege's affect upon the discovery process. " 3
Under Wigmore's empirical approach definitive conclusions are difficult to
reach. However, a strong claim can be made that mediation satisfies the first three
conditions of the test. The fourth condition can be met with a narrow rule of
mediation privilege which reduces the loss of evidence to the justice system while
maintaining the benefits of confidentiality for mediation where most appropriate.
A second theoretical basis for evidentiary privileges is privacy." 4 The
privacy justification focuses on protecting the basic need for individual autonomy,
and not, as with the traditional approach, the collective interest of encouraging
certain communications. Privacy considerations are raised when a person is
compelled to publicly reveal personal information or is forced to breach an
Because such privacy issues arise in mediation -entrusted confidence. "'
personal information is often disclosed and participants regularly pledge to
maintain confidentiality -- the privacy theory lends support for a mediation
privilege for individuals." 6 However, under the privacy theory any legally
cognizable privacy interest is balanced against society's interest in ascertaining the
truth." 7 Thus, both the privacy and traditional theories utilize an empirical
assessment of the costs and benefits as the final step in determining whether a new
privilege should be recognized. In the same vein as argued above, the significant
privacy interests that emerge in mediation can be protected, while minimizing the
impact on the justice system, with a narrowly crafted mediation privilege statute.
A third explanation for the existence of evidentiary privileges is based on
political power."' Simply stated, privileges exist because the classes of persons
affected have the political influence to secure privileged status." 9 At the
extreme, the power rationale questions the legitimacy of all privileges. But to
acknowledge that power may underlie privileges is not to say valuable societal
interests may not also be involved. 2 ' Privilege law reflects shared normative

112. See infra part VI.
113. See infra notes 264-281 and accompanying text.
114. Comment, supra note 101, at 1480-83.
115. Id.at 1481.
116. Less clear are the implications of the privacy theory for organizational mediation parties,
although it has been suggested that limiting the theory to individuals is not a useful approach. Id. at
1482.
117. Id.
118.
Id.at 1493-500.
119. What was once the right of upper class gentlemen in England has became the privilege of
powerful professionals and institutions in America: lawyers, doctors, the Church, the media and
government. Id. at 1494.
120.
Id.
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values that certain conversations are deserving of confidentiality despite
consequences to the justice system. While political power is undoubtably
implicated in decision-making regarding the creation of privilege, as it is in all
legal and political questions, under our democratic system legislatures and courts
are charged with the obligation of accounting for the public interest in light of
perceived shared social vision without allowing power to dominate. That calculus
with respect to mediation has resulted in a profusion of mediation privilege
rules.' Consistent with the power theory, these new privilege rules also reflect
the effectiveness of those interested in the emerging field of mediation in
accessing political and legal processes.
Regardless of the underlying theoretical basis, a host of legislatures and
courts have created mediation privilege rules. Those rules represent the judgment
of many that, on balance, the benefits of protecting mediation communications are
worth the price of the privilege.' 22 A mediation privilege conforms the law to
the expectations of the participants,'23 and holds the potential for remedying the
shortcomings of existing law.
VI. MEDIATION PRIVILEGE PROVISIONS: SCOPE,
CONTENT AND OPERATION ISSUES
Concluding that a mediation privilege is desirable leaves policy-makers with
the difficult task of designing a rule which properly protects the process, the
participants and the public interest. The true test of a provision is the extent to
which it addresses the shortcomings of non-privilege law and the costs associated
with making mediations privileged. The scope, content and operational features
of the privilege must be clearly established. Any rule must account for the
separate, perhaps conflicting interests of mediation parties and the mediator in
maintaining confidentiality. The privilege ought to encompass the field of
mediation and individual mediations from initial client contact to file closing.
Those issues and others must be examined to determine how well the mediation
privilege has made the transition from theory to implementing legislation and court
rules. The analysis can be organized around these questions: 1) which mediation
activities will be privileged; 2) who will be covered by the privilege; 3) in which
later proceedings will the privilege apply; 4) who will hold the right to assert or
waive the privilege; and 5) what information will be excepted from the privileged?

121.
122.
123.

See statutes and court rules cited, supra notes 6-7.
RoGERS & McEWEN, supra note 4, at 114.
See Hyman, supra note 4, at 22.
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A. Mediation Activities to be Privileged
With mediation so widely practiced in varying forms, the initial challenge is
crafting a mediation privilege which is neither over-inclusive nor underinclusive.'24 The ideal statute would cover mediations where confidentiality is
intended by the participants, the mediation is conducted by a qualified mediator
and the privilege is justified as a matter of public policy. Most traditional
privileges arise when a professional relationship is established: attorney-client,
physician-patient or cleric-parishioner.' 25 Mediation is an emerging professional
activity. Public licensure of mediators is a growing trend, but not the norm.' 26
As a result, it is premature in most jurisdictions to base the mediation privilege
upon the formation of a professional relationship with a licensed or certified
mediator. 27 Other approaches have been necessary.
Narrow approaches extend the privilege only to mediations conducted under
the auspices of a particular statute,'28 court,'29 mediation program,3 °
or mediators with specified
alternative dispute resolution procedures'
124. See ROGERs & MCEWEN, supra note 4, at 145-46; Brown, supra note 3, at 326-29.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, Chaps. 82, 86 & 87.
125.
126.
The mediation community is struggling with the issue of mediator qualifications.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 29, at 164-71. Some would open up the field to anyone successfully
completing mediation skills training and a practicum. Id at 165. Others would limit entry entirely
or in certain types of cases to those with academic degrees. Id. For example, marital dissolution case
could be mediated only by mediators with degrees in counseling related fields or law. Id. at 312-13.
Florida has a system of certifying and disciplining mediators. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.106 (West Supp.
1994). In Florida only lawyers may mediate non-family law cases that have been filed as lawsuits in
its highest trial court. FLA. STAT. § 44.102(2) (West 1991). In New Hampshire the privilege in
divorce mediations extends only to mediations conducted by a "certified marital mediator." N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9.1II (1993); see also Edward F. Hartfield, Qualificationsand TrainingStandards
for Mediations of Environmental and Public Policy Disputes, 12 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 109 (1988).
127. Hyman, supra note 4, at 20-21. Even where mediator licensing exists, basing the privilege
on that factor alone would deny confidentiality to parties using an unlicensed mediator. Where the
parties believed the mediator was licensed, the courts may uphold the privilege analogizing to the
attomey-client relationship. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2302.
128.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994) ("mediation may occur pursuant to law");
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-43-205(2) (West 1994) (workers' compensation); Mo. R. Civ. PRO. 88.08
(family law mediations); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1993) (family law); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 5.60.070(1) (West Supp. 1994) (general) and 26.09.015 (West Supp. 1994) (family law); Wis.
STAT. § 904.085(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (privilege applies to mediations conducted under several
cited statutes "or any similar statutory, . . . process.").
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 1994) (court ordered mediation of civil cases).
130.
FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (West Supp. 1994) (citizen dispute settlement centers); MINN.
STAT. § 494.02 (West 1990) (community dispute resolution program); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 849-b
(McKinney 1992) (community dispute resolution centers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-09.10-10 (Supp.
1993) (farm foreclosures); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.75.050 (West 1992) (community dispute
resolution).
131. Texas defines various ADR procedures, then by separate statute extends confidentiality to
all. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023-027 (West Supp. 1994) and § 154.053(a) (West
Supp. 1994). Utah has a similar approach. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7 (1992); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 571(3), (6) (Supp. 1994).
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qualifications and/or training.'32 The advantage of such privilege statutes is
clarity; specifically identifiable classes of mediations are protected.'33 Policymakers are able to pinpoint specific mediations for protection,' and in theory
tailor the privilege's content to best serve a particular type of mediation: for
example, family mediations.. or community disputes.' 36 The weakness of the
narrow approach is that mediations equally warranting protection are not covered.
For example, mediations conducted: 1) in a tort case where the parties and
mediator desire privilege protection but the jurisdiction only has a privilege for
marital dissolution cases, or 2) by a highly skilled mediator who, it is discovered
after the mediation, fails to meet the training or experience requirements of the
privilege statute. "' This approach also has the potential for confusion in states
with several narrowly drawn mediation privilege statutes, rather than a general
statute, if each provision has significantly varying terms. 3 s
In contrast to narrow approaches, other statutes have a broad reach. 39
Laudably, these general rules extend the privilege across the entire field of
mediation.
Unfortunately, such statutes do so often without defining
"mediation, '"'4 or defining it so broadly' 4' so as to include any intervention

132.
The Massachusetts privilege applies only to mediations involving a mediator with the
following qualifications: "a person not a party to a dispute who enters into a written agreement with
the parties to assist them in resolving their disputes and has completed at least thirty hours of training
in mediation and who either has four years of professional experience as a mediator or is accountable
to a dispute resolution organization which has been in existence for at least three years or one who has
been appointed to mediate by a judicial or governmental body." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 223, § 23C
(1986). See also COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-22-302(2) & (3) (Supp. 1993) ("Mediation services" defined
as settlement discussions with a "mediator" which is defined as "a trained individual.").
In New
Hampshire the privilege in divorce mediations extends only to mediations conducted by a "certified
marital mediator." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9.III (Supp. 1993):
133. Brown, supra note 3, at 326 ("Such laws pose little definitional problems.").
134.
Many states have privilege statutes covering specific case types and not others. Most
common are family law conciliation and mediation statutes, community dispute resolution centers, civil
rights statutes, labor relations and farm loan mediation programs. California for example, has at least
six privilege statutes. See infra note 138 listing those statutes. Other states merely have a single
general statute.
135. FED. R. EVID. 507.
136. MINN. STAT. § 494.02 (1990); N.Y. JuD. LAW § 849-b (McKinney 1992).
137. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 223, § 23C (1986) (quoted, supra note 132).
138.
California provides the most vivid example of a state with a multitude of mediation
confidentiality provisions. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1994); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§ 54453 (West Supp. 1994) (labor disputes); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3177 (West Supp. 1994) (child
custody); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12984 (West Supp. 1994) (housing discrimination); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12985 (West 1992) (housing discrimination); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.371 (West Supp. 1991)
(int'l commercial disputes).
139. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.21 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REv. CODE § 5.60.070 (Supp. 1994).
140. Wyo. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-45 (1994).
141. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(F) (1994) (private settlement discussions with a neutral
"outside of a formal court proceeding"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.21 (Michie 1992) ("[p]rocess by
which a mediator assists and facilitates two or more parties to a controversy in reaching a mutually
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by a third party.' 42 The unintended effect of such statutes may be application
to a teacher attempting to settle a playground fight,'43 a neighbor presiding over
a family dispute' 44 or a bystander intervening in a dispute between drivers after
a traffic accident. 4 ' Recognizing these problems, certain provisions narrow the
definition of mediation with qualifying adjectives: "'[m]ediation' is the deliberate
and knowing146 use of a neutral' third person."'' 48 This effort to reduce
over-inclusiveness with "self-referential"' 49 and vague modifying terms only
opens up the privilege to post hoc challenges. The privilege would not apply if
a party could later prove she did not realize or understand the nature of the
process she had engaged in or could show that the mediator lacked impartiality or
neutrality. 5 Though well intentioned, the broad approach yields uncertainty
and the potential for significant over-inclusiveness.
A third approach, found in a few statutes, is to activate the privilege when
the mediation occurs pursuant to an order of court' 5 or agreement between the
mediation parties.5 2 For example, the Washington statute triggers the privilege

"); ABA Model, supra note 6, at 65 § 1(a) ("'Mediation' is the use of a
acceptable resolution.
neutral third person by disputing parties to help them reach a resolution of their dispute.").
142.

Id

143. Hyman, supra note 4, at 19.
144.
Statements made by divorcing parents regarding their children while a neighbor is
attempting to help them resolve their differences could become privileged. Investigating social
agencies and the court would be denied access to the information. Id. at 19-20.
145. If a bystander intervenes to bring reason to the discussions between arguing drivers, one
driver's admissions about the color of the light before the accident during the negotiations may be
privileged.
146. With similar effect, the Wyoming statute defines confidential communications as those "not
intended to be disclosed." WYO. STAT. § 143-102 (Supp. 1994).
147. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(F) (1993) (neutral third party); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.023(a) (West Supp. 1994) (impartial person); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.21 (Michie
1992) (impartial third party).
148. Hyman, supra note 4, at 71, § 1(2) (emphasis added).
149.

Id. at 22.

150. The use of modifiers such as "impartial" or "neutral" could result in the loss of the privilege
when it was later discovered the mediator has some connection to the dispute or a party, even though
the mediation was conducted with absolute neutrality. Also, parties agreeing to use a mediator with
knowledge of the dispute, viewing that knowledge as an asset to their mediation, face the loss of the
privilege. Id. at 22-23.
151. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311 (Supp.
1993)(providing for court referrals for "mediation services" which are privileged under COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-22-307 (West Supp. 1993)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 1994); OR. REv.
STAT. §36.200(4) (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994) ("court-referred
process"); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994).
152.
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994) (voluntary decision of the parties); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1993) (makes
confidential "mediation services" defined in COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-302(3) (1991) to be "... a
process ... parties. . . agree to enter"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.014(1) (Vernons 1992); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(k) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (".. . pursuant to an agreement to mediate."); Mo. REv. STAT. §
435.014 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (Supp. 1993) ("When persons agree to conduct and
participate in a mediation."); OKLA. STAT. tit 12, § 1804 (1993) (requires parties to complete a
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"[i]f there is a court order to mediate, a written agreement between the parties to
mediate,.".'..,
These statutes generally require written agreements to mediate
to avoid the obvious proof problems of oral agreements. 54 To activate the
privilege, some of the statutes insist that the parties' agreement include a recitation
of statutory language or other language evidencing their intent that

communications will be confidential.'
Such "magic language" requirements
are unjustified
traps
for
careless
parties
who
nevertheless intended to invoke the
56
privilege.
Requiring written agreements to mediate is not without its problems. For
example, conciliation programs attempt to resolve disputes exclusively via
telephone contacts with the parties and do not utilize written agreements to

proscribed form, agreeing on the type of dispute procedure they wish to use, which specifies that
proceeding will be confidential); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993) ("If there is a written agreement
between any parties to a dispute that mediation communications will be confidential,.
"); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994) ("If there is ... a written agreement between the parties to
mediate.. . ."); WIS. STAT. § 904.085(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) (mediation, to which confidentiality applies,
includes "contractual ... process").
The Symposium Model provision requires both the parties and the mediator to agree to
confidentiality to trigger the privilege. Hyman, supra n.6 at 71, § 2 ("where the parties and the
mediator have agreed that they shall be confidential.").
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp 1994).
154.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014(1) (1992) ("parties to a dispute agree in writing"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993) ("written agreement between any parties to a dispute"); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994) ("written agreement between the parties to mediate"). Statutes not
requiring a writing include: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(3) (Supp. 1993) ("... . parties involved in
a dispute, . . . agree to enter into one or more settlement discussions .. "); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(k)
(1988 & Supp. 1994) ("pursuant to an agreement to mediate"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (Supp.
1993) (".... when parties agree to conduct and participate in a mediation"); Hyman, supra note 6 at
71, § 2.
None of the cited statutes require a signed written agreement to mediate, which allows for
flexible interpretation as to the meaning of "agreement" For example, in a recent Washington case,
a "written agreement to mediate" was found from one party's letter to the mediator, reflecting the other
party's assent to mediate, and the mediator's letter to the parties confirming the mediation. In re
Dennis R. Ryan, Case No. 92 4974, Wash. Board of Industrial Appeals. The mediator in that case now
requires parties to sign an agreement to mediate in his presence. Id. Affidavit of Mediator on file with
the author.
155. The original language of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5(c) provided: "This section does not
apply unless, before the mediation begins, the persons who agree to conduct and participate in the
mediation execute an agreement in writing that sets out the text of subdivisions (a) and (b) [text of the
privilege] and states that the persons agree that this section shall apply to the mediation." CAL. EViD.
CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1994). The current Oregon statute requires party agreement that the ".
. mediation communications be confidential." OR. REv. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993). Such language
creates a risk that the privilege will not be activated without the presence of the "magic language" in
the parties' agreement. Hyman, supra note 6, at 71, § 2.
156.
If the requirements for the application of the privilege go beyond the minimum proof
necessary to evidence the parties' desire to settle their differences, then they become unnecessary
procedural obstacles. Brown, supra note 3, at 329; Green, supra note 5, at 2, 30. Any agreement of
the parties to mediate should effectuate the privilege. Parties who did not intend or later do not wish
their mediation communications to be confidential may, under most privilege statutes, waive the
privilege.
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Also, in mediations where emotions are high, the trust level low and
mediate.'
great reluctance to sign anything exists, such as in certain marital, labor or
environmental disputes, requiring parties to sign an agreement at the beginning of
the process may dampen or scuttle the mediation.' 58
Of the three approaches examined, the Washington statute best minimizes
both over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness. The Washington statute's broad
availability is tempered by the court order/agreement to mediate requirement.
Privilege protection is extended to disputes where most needed: parties in litigation
and parties who unequivocally intended to mediate, both situations where the
presence of a "professional" mediator is likely. By triggering its operation on the
existence of a writing, the statute's application is unambiguous.
The Washington-type statute does have the potential for being underinclusive. For example, those who mediate without a court order or written
59
agreement do not access the privilege. Legally uninformed or careless parties
and mediators are placed in peril. However, most mediators are cognizant of the
importance of confidentially issues, and most regularly use written agreements to
mediate. 6 ' Moreover, policy-makers have options available to reduce the risks
caused by the court order/mediation agreement requirement to particular mediation
programs (dispute resolution centers) or subject matter areas (family law). They
may eliminate the requirement for 162mediations conducted by specified
t
programs"' or under particular statutes.
Once a mediation falls within the privilege, care must be taken to ensure that
the entire process receives the privilege's protection (from the first intake call to
the exit interview). Protection is especially needed for the sensitive information
that is often disclosed by prospective mediation clients to program staff during

157. The conciliation process is most frequently used by community dispute resolution programs.
Confidentiality can extend to a center's telephone conciliation by creating a specific privilege that
applies to all the center's dispute resolution activities. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992). Another
possibility is to state in a general statute that all dispute resolution conducted by specified community
centers will be privilege under the general statute. A third alternative would be a statutory delegation
of authority to judges or an administrative agency to certify dispute resolution programs and/or
providers, with one of the effects being that mediations conducted by certified providers would be
privileged.
158. On the other hand, negotiating the terms of confidentiality, in mediations where trust levels
are low, can be the means for improving trust before the substantive discussions begin. If successful,
the parties have learned they can agree about something at least.
159. Counsel for represented mediation parties can be expected to take the necessary steps to
protect their client's interests in confidential communication.
See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. This is not always the case however.
160.
Recently in Seattle a professional mediator associated with a national mediation group was subpoenaed
to testify because of the failure to secure a written agreement to mediate from the parties. The
subpoena was ultimately quashed because an agreement was found by the administrative law judge in
the participants' exchange of correspondence. See supra note 154.
161.
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992) (dispute resolution centers).
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994); ("if mediation is mandated under RCW 7.7
100"- health care claims).
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intake interviews.

63

Many statutes are vulnerable to narrow interpretation

because they do not define the mediation process,'"6 define it vaguely with terms
like "mediation,"' 61 "resolution process,"' 66 or limit the protection to
information disclosed "during" or "in the course of" mediation 167 or only when
the mediator is present. 68 Such statutes put into question the confidentiality of
intake, inter-session and exit interview communications.
The Washington statute contains the phrase "any communication made or
materials submitted in, or in connection with, 1 69 the mediation proceeding."' 70
The word "proceeding" encompasses the whole of the mediation process, similar
to the word "case" in the litigation context.' 7'
To add clarity some statutes
specifically state that the mediation process commences with initial intake

163. A principal objective of the mediation privilege is to free mediation programs and their staff
from the burden of responding to subpoenas. Hyman, supra note 4, at 25-26. Case law exists with
respect to other privileges extending confidentiality to interactions with those assisting the professional.
See, e.g., Sibley v. Wopple, 16 N.Y. 180 (1857) (lawyer/clerk); Taylor v. Taylor, 177 S.E. 582 (Ga.
1934) (lawyer/secretary); Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 65 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1954) (doctor/nurse). Courts
may interpret mediation privilege statutes similarly to include the staff members of mediation
organizations.
164. WYO. STAT. § 1-43-103 (Supp. 1994).
165. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994).
166. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014(l) (1992) ("during the resolution process," but later in the statute
communication made "in setting up" the mediation afforded confidentiality); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE §§ 154.023 & .073(a) (Supp. 1994) ("communication ... in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure .... ).
167. Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11; MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986)
(but must also be in the presence of the mediator); MINN. STAT. §§ 494.02 (1990) ("during dispute
resolution") & 595.02(k) (1988 & Supp. 1994) ("in the course of'); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11
(Supp. 1993) ("in the course of').
168. MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986).
169. With this phrasing any information surfacing in the mediation is covered regardless of the
degree to which it is relied on. The intent is to avoid a result like that reached in Newark Bd. of Educ.
v. Newark Teachers Union, 377 A.2d 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), where a document given
to the mediator to pass on to the other party, but not read by the mediator, was held to be discoverable.
170. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994).
171.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1993) ("mediation service proceeding"); FLA. STAT.
§§ 44.102(3), 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994) ("mediation proceeding" and "proceeding"). The Colorado
statute defines "mediation services" to include "one or more settlement discussions with a mediator.
.COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(3) (Supp. 1993).
In those states where an agreement to mediate triggers the privilege, an issue exists as to the
confidentiality of intake statements if the mediation does not go forward and an agreement is never
signed. The Florida privilege relating to citizen dispute settlement centers addresses this issue as "[any
information relating to a dispute obtained by any person while performing any duties for the center.
, is confidential." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (West 1991). Colorado's statute specifically covers
any communication provided in confidence to ... a mediation organization .. . ." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-22-307(2) (Supp. 1993). See Krueger v. Washington Fed. Sav. Bank, 406 N.W.2d 543,
545 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that communications concerning whether to mediate were not
confidential). For federal administrative dispute resolution proceedings, the privilege is extended to
information that is provided with the express intent that it be confidential or under circumstances that
create a reasonable expectation that disclosure would not occur. 5 U.S.C. § 571(7) (1994).
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spans multiple sessions
discussions,' 172
74
termination.

73

and ends only with resolution or

B. Persons Covered by the Privilege
Mediators, mediation parties, the parties' lawyers and the staff of mediation
organizations are involved in mediation. Others may be present during a
175
staff
mediation session: a party's family members or "support persons,"'
members and outside consultants of an organizational party, "witnesses," mediator
trainees and other observers. Once a mediation falls within the privilege there is
no policy justification for allowing disclosure of information acquired during
mediation by anyone. Everyone with access to mediation information should be
"burdened" by the privilege.
76
Statutes vary in their effectiveness on this issue. Those that name no one
risk an interpretation that the mediation privilege is limited to those in the
"professional relationship," the parties and the mediator, leaving others present free
to disclose or subject to subpoena.. Other statutes which name only the
parties,'77 the mediator' or both 79 may limit the reach of the privilege to

172. The Missouri statute extends confidentiality to communications "made in setting up" the
mediation. MO. REv. STAT. § 435.014(2) (1992). The Symposium Model's definition of"mediation"
states: "For purposes of this statute/rule, a mediation commences at the time of initial contact with a
mediator or mediation program." Hyman, supra note 6, at 71, § l(a).
173. Oregon and Virginia provisions define the privileged interval to include ... all contacts
between the mediator and any party or parties, until such time as a resolution is agreed to by the parties
or the parties discharge the mediator." OR. REV. STAT. § 36.110(6) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.21 (Michie 1992). Both provisions unfortunately appear to fail to specifically include contacts
with mediation organization staff other than the mediator.
174. The Oregon provision states that the ending point of the process does not occur "until such
time as a resolution is agreed to by the parties or the mediation process is terminated." OR. REV.
STAT. § 36.110(6). Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.21 (Michie 1992) (resolution "or the parties discharge
the mediator").
175. The physician/patient privilege includes communications by the patient's family members
to the medical staff. Grosslight v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The same
rationale ought to apply to a person present at the mediation providing support to a party as a surrogate
family member. Cf. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding attorney-client
privilege encompassed client discussions with accountant in the attorney's employ).
176. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (Supp. 1993).
177. FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994) ("[e]ach party ... has a privilege ... to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing .... "). The intended meaning of "another" in the
Florida statute is unclear. If "another" means another party, does that exclude the mediator or is
"another" intended to include all present? Confusion may arise because the waiver provision of the
Florida statute applies to parties. Id. Expansively interpreting "party" and "another" to determine who
is burdened by the privilege may have the unwanted effect of increasing the class of persons whose
consent is required to waive the privilege. The Symposium Model presents this problem as well.
Hyman, supra note 6 at 71, §§ 1(a), 2. One may want to burden a party's relative, "witness" or
lawyer, or a mediation trainee who is present during the mediation, but not give them a voice in
whether mediation information is disclosed.
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The same result could occur with statutes that use the word
Several statutes extend to all persons present. s2
For
privilege
on
"the
example, the Washington statute places the burden of the
mediator, a mediation organization, a party or any person present."'8 3 By
specifically listing all who may have access to information arising out of a
mediation proceeding, the Washington statute ensures comprehensive protection
against disclosure. It also eliminates the argument that confidentiality is waived
by the presence of persons other than the mediator and the parties." 4
those named.'
"participants."''

C. Later Proceedings in Which the Privilege Will Be Effective
Crafting a mediation privilege statute also involves considering the
Traditionally,
subsequent proceedings in which the privilege will apply.
confidential information protected by a privilege is exempt from discovery' and
barred from evidence in civil and criminal actions. 6 Mediation privilege
provisions have taken differing approaches. Many are silent 8 7 or list only

178. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.015(3) (Supp. 1994). The Wisconsin mediation privilege is a
bit awkward. While it only specifically forbids subpoenaing the mediator, other language provides that
no mediation "communication ... is admissible in evidence or subject to discovery or compulsory
process." Presumably the intent is that mediation parties and other participants, as well as the
mediator, will not be subject to process. WiS. STAT. § 904.085 (Supp. 1994).
179. Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2) (Supp. 1993);
5 U.S.C. § 574(a), (b) (1994).
Expressio unius est exclusio alternius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
180.
another). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 692 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-43-103(a) (Supp. 1994); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
181.
154.073(a) (West Supp. 1994).
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993); VA.
CODE ANN.§ 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986); MO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 435.014(2) (Vemons 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992). The Utah statute
could cause confusion. First "all communications ... made by the participant" are made confidential,
then "participants" and "the third party facilitator" may not be subpoenaed, and finally "all parties" may
waive the privilege in writing. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3lb-7(1)(a), (2) & (3)(a) (1992). Only a few
statutes specifically mention mediation organization personnel. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)
(Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994).
183. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070 (Supp. 1994); N.Y. JuD. LAw § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992);
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(k) (1988 & Supp. 1994) ("A person cannot be examined ....").
184. Under traditional privilege law, the privilege is waived if communications occur while a
third party is present WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2311 (attorney-client), § 2339 (wifehusband) and § 2381 (physician-patient).
185. FED. R Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
186. FED. R. EID. 1101(c).
187. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.115 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.2238(B) (1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-53(c) (West 1986); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 435.014 (Vemons 1992); PUERTO
RiCO, tit. 4, Sec. 532(d); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.015(3) (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-43-103(a)
(Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994).
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"civil" cases.'
"any

Other statutes extend the privilege to "civil and criminal,"' s 9

proceeding,"'

90

proceeding," 9 ' "judicial or
administrative proceeding"' 92 or other' 93 proceedings.
Statutes referencing "civil and criminal" are consistent with existing privilege
law and will undoubtedly be interpreted to extend to such actions. Judicial
treatment is less certain for silent statutes and those using vague phrases: "any
proceeding" and "any subsequent proceeding." However, if the state involved has
a counterpart to Federal Evidence Rule 1101(c), then the rule of privilege will
apply to "all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings.' 94 Statutes limiting
the privilege to civil cases may reflect a policy judgment that the criminal justice
system's need for access to mediation information outweighs the benefit of
A narrower policy consideration may
preserving mediation confidentiality. 9
be to protect the safety of those involved in mediation or threatened third parties.
The latter concern is better addressed through specific exceptions to the mediation
"any

subsequent

legal

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-811 (1993); N.D.
188.
CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.34 (Purdon 1992). The Maryland
and New Hampshire privilege for domestic relations cases is limited to subsequent family law cases.
MD. ST. R. Si'. P RuLE S73A(e); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9.II (Supp. 1993). Ohio's family
mediation privilege covers any action or proceeding "other than a criminal, delinquency, child abuse,
child neglect, or dependent child action... ." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(C) (Anderson 1993).
189. Idaho Rule of Evidence 507(2) (relating to child custody and visitation mediations); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29(3) (1988).
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355 (West 1991); MICH. COMi'. LAWS ANN. § 552.513(3) (West
1988). Note that North Dakota's family law privilege, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-06 (1991),
covering "any proceeding" is broader than the state's general mediation privilege, which does not apply
if the "evidence relates to a crime, civil fraud, or Ijuvenile violation]."
FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (1994).
191.
192. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(3) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.201(5) (1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 710, para. 20/6 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.12(2) (West 1994); MASS. GEN.
L. ANN. ch.233, § 23C (West 1986) ; MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1) (1994) (privilege applies to testimony
in civil or criminal cases and "before any person who has authority to receive evidence"); N.Y. JUD.
LAw § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805C (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 36.205(1) (1993); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (West Supp. 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(l)(b) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 5.60.070(1), 7.75.050 (1994 & 1992).
193.
The force of the mediation privileges in other alternative dispute resolution settings is
unclear. A few states include arbitration in the list of fora affected by the mediation privilege.
Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11 ("arbitral, judicial or other proceeding"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 336.153 ("administrative, civil, or arbitration proceeding"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150,
§ 10A (West 1994) (same). The mediation privilege should apply in any later arbitration since that
procedure is adjudicatory in nature. Hyman, supra note 4, at 33. This would be particularly true of
court-annexed arbitrations. In Maine's medical malpractice mediation panel system, the privilege
applies to "any subsequent court action and any other public disclosure." ME. REV. STAT. tit 24, §
2857(1) (1990 & Supp. 1993).
FED. R. EVID. I 101(c).
194.
See People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (in which New York's
195.
mediation privilege statute was interpreted to bar the district attorney from obtaining mediation records
of a local dispute resolution center in a homicide case).
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privilege.' 96
Mediation privileges which do not apply to criminal cases are
inconsistent with traditional privileges and produce a chilling effect upon
mediation discussions.'97 Such statutes are particularly onerous in jurisdictions
with programs for mediating criminal complaints. 8
Such programs cannot
operate unless the accused is assured mediation communications will be barred
from the criminal trial.' 99 This reality was recognized by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in Byrd v. State,00 which, in the absence of a privilege statute, held that
a mediation settlement agreement from a criminal diversion program was not
admissible in the accused's subsequent criminal prosecution as an admission of
guilt. In reaching this result, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated:
By allowing this alternative dispute resolution effort to be evidenced in
the subsequent criminal trial, the trial court's ruling eliminates its
usefulness. For no criminal defendant will agree to 'work things out'
and compromise his position if he knows that any inference of
responsibility arising from what he says and does in the mediation
process will be admissible as an admission of guilt in the criminal
proceeding which will eventualize if mediation fails.2"'
Even in mediations not directly involving a criminal complaint -- family
matters, neighborhood disputes and business situations -- mediation discussions
will be restricted if the parties learn that what they say or submit may be used
later in a criminal courtroom.
Statutes, such as Washington's, which extend the privilege to "any judicial
or administrative proceeding ' 0 2 properly protect mediation communications from
use in criminal cases. They also recognize the prevalence of administrative justice
in our contemporary legal system and the need to exclude privileged mediation
communications from administrative hearings.2 3

196. See infra notes 323-33 and accompanying text.
197.
Cf Williams v. State, 342 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ga. App. Ct. 1986) (settlement agreement
signed by employee admitting to have taken and agreeing to repay employer $6,000 was admitted in
employee's criminal trial).
198. Friedman, supranote 4, at 189-96 (describing the Night Prosecutor Program in Columbus,
Ohio).
199. Id. at 198-200; see also Byrd v. State, 367 S.E.2d 300, 303 (Ga. App. Ct. 1988).
200. Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 300; Accord Williams v. State, 770 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) ("Contrary to the State's assertions, we cannot consider any evidence from the dispute resolution
procedure that appellant and complainant participated in prior to his [appellant's] arrest, as disclosures
made in an ADR procedure are confidential, and not subject to disclosure."). The Texas court relied
on its state's ADR privilege statute. TEx. Ctv. PRAC. & RflM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (West Supp.
1994). Contra Williams v. State, 342 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ga. App. Ct. 1986) (involving a mediation
conducted by a private mediator).
201.
Byrd, 367 S.E.2d at 302.
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994); see also statutes cited supra note 192.
203. For example, mediations are regularly conducted in industrial injury cases in Washington
in advance of an administrative hearing. See generally Harter, supra note 15, at 348-56.
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D. Holders of the Privilege
A critical task of any mediation privilege law is establishing who holds the
right to assert or waive the privilege (i.e., a "holder" of the privilege). Holder
status varies in the traditional privileges. With the attorney-client and physicianpatient privileges the protection of the client/patient disclosure is paramount.
Therefore, only the client/patient holds the privilege.2 °4 In contrast, under the
traditional rule husbands and wives are joint holders of the spousal privilege.2" 5
Each spouse retains control over disclosures by the other.20 6
With respect to the cleric-penitent privilege, statutes vary as to whether the
penitent, the cleric, or both are holders of the privilege. 0 7 In some jurisdictions
the cleric may refuse to testify even if the penitent has waived the privilege in
deference to the cleric's religious obligation not to discuss confidential
communications. 0 '
The mediation process presents a unique context for the operation of an
evidentiary privilege. Rather than the usual bilateral relationship in traditional
privileges, mediation always involves at least three persons: the mediator and two
parties. Additionally, two distinct relationships are at work simultaneously in a
mediation: a professional relationship between the mediator and each of the
parties, and a confidential relationship between the parties. Both relationships
generate distinct interests in preserving confidentiality.
Generally, the parties and the mediator share a common interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of mediation communications. However, after a
failed mediation, interests may diverge as to whether mediation communications
ought to be disclosed. Each of the participants -- the mediator or either of the
parties -- in different circumstances may wish to maintain confidentiality, or
discover or introduce mediation information in a later proceeding. A mediation

204.
As to the attorney-client privilege "the waiver, like the privilege, belongs solely to the
client, and not to the attorney." WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9 § 2327 at 635. As a general
rule only, the patient, if competent, may waive the physician-patient privilege. SCOTT N. STONE &
ROBERT K. TAYLOR, I TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 7.20 (2d ed. 1993).
205. Under the traditional rule a spouse has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent the
other spouse from disclosing confidential communications, with exceptions for civil actions between
the spouses and criminal assaults perpetrated by one spouse against the other. ROBERT ARONSON, THE
.LAw OF EVIDENCE INWASHINGTON, 501-19 (2d ed. 1993); STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 5.09.
However, it has been suggested by some that only the communicating spouse should hold the right to
assert or waive the spousal privilege. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2340 at 670-71. Under
such a rule the hearing spouse cannot assert the privilege to stop the speaking spouse from disclosing.
Some states have an expanded spousal privilege, allowing a spouse-party to prevent a spousewitness from testifying, regardless of whether the testimony related to confidential communications
between the spouses. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (Supp. 1994). Such rules in actuality are
spousal competency rules.
206. Id.
207. See generally STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 6.08.
208. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (Anderson 1991) (cleric to testify if penitent
has waived privilege, unless the disclosure "is in violation of [the cleric's] sacred trust."); Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
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privilege must rationally reconcile these potentially competing interests in an

unambiguous fashion.
Special care must be taken to protect the role of the mediator. Preserving
20 9
As a
confidences in order to maintain neutrality is elemental for mediators.
result, mediators regularly refuse to be the "tie-breaking" witness in a subsequent
proceeding, even when the parties so desire.210 Mediator testimony inevitably
Moreover, if
leads to one of the parties viewing the mediator as biased.2 1
mediator testimony becomes commonplace, the public is likely to form the
undesirable perception that the particular mediator or the mediation process does
These important policy considerations were
not protect confidences.212
recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Macaluso, Inc.2" 3
The court stated:

"Maintaining confidentiality is critical to the dispute resolution process." ROGERS &
209.
SALEM, supra note 5, at 263 (quoting Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Ethical Standards
of Professional Responsibility, Standard 3 [hereinafter SPIDR Ethical Standards]).
210. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 53-56 (9th Cir. 1980); see also
Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 978 (D.D.C. 1980), affd, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); People v.
Reyes, 816 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.Cal. 1992); Cohen v. Cohen, 290 N.Y.Supp.2d 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968); Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto, 614 So.2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Simrin v. Simrin,
43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965); People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985);
Kruger v. Washington Federal Savings Bank, 406 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (providing an
example of a mediator being forced testify). An example of a mediator who apparently was willing
to testify is found in Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct App. 1985).
211.
Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (" '... . the proffered
reasons for [the mediator's] testimony are insufficient to overcome the compelling need for a mediator
to maintain the confidences of the parties and the appearance of impartiality.'"). A mediator's
testimony, no matter how truthful and unbiased, is likely to be perceived as harmful by one or more
of the parties. Since mediators generally make no formal record of the mediation, they will have
difficulty testifying as to the specific statements made. Under such circumstances, mediator testimony
is likely to be interpretive or evaluative, rather than descriptive, heightening the risk the parties will
view the mediator as biased after the fact. A party who viewed the mediator as neutral during the
mediation is likely to alter her view if the testifying mediator reveals "damaging" mediation
information. Prigoff, supra note 4, at 2; Brown, supra note 3, at 309-10 ("To remain effective the
mediator must be perceived as impartial by the parties.").
212. In two cases, courts have upheld the quashing of a subpoena issued to a mediator of the
Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice. Port Arthur v. United States, 517
F. Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The effectiveness of the CRS is ... dependent upon the actual and
perceived impartiality of its mediators. The public interest in maintaining this impartiality greatly
outweighs plaintiff's need for Mr. Greenwald's [the mediator's] testimony."); People v. Reyes, 816
F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Cal. 1992); see also Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) ("... the policy of promoting successful mediation of public employment disputes outweighed
the need for disclosing what the mediator believed was happening in this instance.").
The federal administrative dispute resolution provision recognizes the importance of party and
public perceptions of the neutral's willingness to maintain confidences. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4) (1994).
Under that law, a court may order disclosure by the neutral (or a party) only if the need for disclosure
outweighs "the integrity of dispute resolution proceedings in general by reducing the confidence of
parties in future cases that their communications will remain confidential." Id.
213. N.L.R.B. v. Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1980).
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However useful the testimony of a conciliator might be . .. in any
given case, . . . the conciliators must maintain a reputation for
impartiality, and the parties to conciliation conferences must feel free
to talk without any fear that the conciliator may subsequently make
disclosures as a witness in some other proceeding, to the possible
disadvantage of a party to the conference. If conciliators were
permitted or required to testify about their activities, or if the production
of notes or reports of their activities could be required, not even the
strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence
from favoring or seeming to favor one side or the other.2" 4
Subjecting mediators and mediation organization records to subpoena disrupts
the delivery of mediation services.' 5 This is particularly true for community
dispute resolution centers which rely heavily on volunteers.216 Fighting off
subpoenas, the usual response in these cases, is time consuming, costly and anxiety
provoking. The limited situations in which a mediator may feel compelled to
breach confidentiality irrespective of party preferences, such as to protect a
vulnerable person or to prevent an injustice, can be accommodated through
exceptions to the privilege.217 For these reasons, a mediation privilege statute
should give the mediator holder status which is independent from that of the
parties."'
As with other aspects of the mediation privilege, statutes vary vastly as to
their treatment of this important issue. Some statutes are silent 219 as to who
holds the privilege. Others assign the rights to assert and/or waive the privilege

214. Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 55 (quotingTomlinson of High Point Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688
(1947).
215. Hyman, supra note 4, at 21, 50.
216. Prigoff, supra note 4, at 2-3.
217. See infra part VI.E.2.c. Mediation is an emerging profession with practitioners from many
disciplines. Most jurisdictions do not yet have certification/licensing processes for mediators and
professional codes with disciplinary sanctions. Professional mediation organizations have promulgated
codes of ethics, but their effect is heuristic. Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility for the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (1986); Joint Committee Standards, supra note 13.
Mediators bring to the process ethical traditions of their various fields. See, e.g., ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, American Bar Association, Summary of the Actions
of the House of Delegates, Report of Sections 22-23 (1984). During this period of developing ethical
standards for mediation, mediation privilege statutes serve an instructive function regarding the
appropriateness of disclosing classes of mediation information.
218. Hoxie, supra note 4, at 445-46 ("[Plrotection of the mediator's status as a neutral demands
recognition of a distinct privilege on his part not to testify."); Hyman, supra note 4 at 33-34, 50-53.
Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11; CAL. FAM. CODE § 4607, repealed CAL. FAM.
219.
CoDE § 3177 (West Supp. 1994); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 856(6) (1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §
13.14(2) (West Supp. 1994); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 552.513, 691.1557 (West 1988 & 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(1)(k) (West 1994); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 435.014 (1992); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
1805(C) (1993); R.1. GEN. LAws § 15-5-29(3) (1988); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073
(West Supp. 1994).
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to the parties only,22 ° the mediator only,22' or the parties and the mediator as
joint holders.222 A small group of statutes bifurcates the "holder" status by
assigning separate rights to the parties and the mediator.223
Silent Statutes: A silent statute can be expected to generate confusion in the
In one case, a silent statute has been
tripartite setting of mediation. 224
interpreted to be non-waivable by the mediation parties.22
Party-Holder Statutes: Statutes226 making parties exclusive holders of the
mediation privilege are in accordance with traditional privilege law. Mediation
parties as clients of the mediation professional exercise the privilege rights, as do
clients and patients of attorneys and physicians under those privileges.227 Also,
mediation parties exercise holder rights jointly because their special confidential
relationship is analogous to the marital privilege. Party-holder statutes are also
consistent with mediation ideology that lodges decision-making power with the
parties."' While the joint party-holder approach is appropriate with respect to
party disclosures, the mediator is afforded no means to resist compelled
testimony. Such statutes undervalue the critical interest of preserving perceptions
neutrality for all parties in individual cases and the public at
of mediator
9
large.

22

220. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(1) (1994); FLA. STAT. §§ 44.102(3), 44.201(5) (Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-606(a) (1988) (party or "anyone the party authorizes" may assert the
privilege; statute is silent on waiver rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-811 (1993); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(3)(a) (1992); WASH. REV. CODE §
7.75.050 (1992) (allows waiver if "all the parties to the communication waive"); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-581.22(i) (Michie 1992).
Under the Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming provisions, the parties hold the privilege, but
the mediator (and others) may assert the privilege on a party's behalf. IDAHO R. OF EviD. 507-3,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3lb-7(2) & (3)(a) (1992); WiS. STAT. § 904.085 (Supp. 1994); WYO.STAT.
§ 1-43-103(a) (Supp. 1994). For example, Idaho Rule of Evidence 507-3 provides that the privilege
may be asserted "for the client through his mediator, lawyer, guardian or conservator, or the personal
representative of a deceased client."
221. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150, § 10A (West Supp. 1994) (privilege for labor mediators);
OIO REV. CODE § 3109.06(C) (Anderson Supp. 1993) (creates mediator only privilege which cannot
be waived by the parties).
222. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(a) (Supp. 1993);N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(4) (Supp.
1993).
223. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.205(2)(a) & (3) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.60.070(l)(a) &
(2)(a) (Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a) & (b) (1994); Hyman, supra note 6, at 72, § (4)(b)(1).
224. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 4, at 116.
In re Rosson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a silent statute was
225.
interpreted to give the trial court, and not the parties, the right to waive the privilege). People v.
Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (silent statute evidenced legislative intent that privilege
cannot be waived),
226. See statutes cited supra at note 220.
227. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
228. MOORE, supra, note 18, at 6 ("As with negotiations, mediation leaves decision-making
power in the hands of the people in conflict").
229. See supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text.
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Statutes 230 vesting "holder" rights
Mediator-Only Holder Statutes:
exclusively in the mediator are consistent with the cleric-penitent privilege in a
few jurisdictions, but an inversion of traditional privilege rights as to other
privileges based on a professional relationship."' The mediator is given sole
authority to assert or waive the privilege. Mediation clients lose all control over
disclosure decisions, even when all are agreeable to disclosure. 23 2 Party
preferences become legally irrelevant as to communications involving their privacy
interests.233 Also, this type of statute invites undesirable lobbying of the
mediator by a party wanting to disclose mediation communications.234 The
mediator will make an enemy of one of the parties no matter what she does. The
limited benefit of such statutes is that the parties cannot force mediator
disclosures.235 Less restrictive alternatives exist to accomplish that result.236
Joint-Holder Statutes: Statutes 237 making the mediator and the parties joint
holders of the privilege ostensibly balance the power to assert or waive the
privilege. Mediators have the means to avoid compelled testimony; parties may
assert the privilege against a mediator who has decided to disclose mediation
information. However, joint-holder provisions have the potential for causing
stalemate. While the mediator no longer holds absolute power under ajoint-holder
statute, she effectively has veto power over parties' disclosures. A mediator is
unlikely to join in a waiver of the privilege to permit party disclosures if the result
is that she may be called to testify.23 This statutory scheme also encourages
parties to lobby the mediator. One party may seek a mediator's vote for
disclosure as a means of convincing the other party to agree to waive
confidentiality. Joint-holder provisions represent little improvement over other
statutes examined to this point.

See statutes cited supra at note 221.
See supra notes 204-208 and accompanying text.
For example, an Ohio statute applying to family law cases does not permit mediator
testimony even if the parties agree to the mediator testifying. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.06(C)
230.
231.
232.

(Anderson 1993).
233. Cf Formerly under California law counties could opt by local rule to allow the mediators
to make custody/visitation recommendations to the court, and testify, if the parties fail to reach
settlement in mediation. Such a rule removed any power of the parties to oppose disclosure. For a
criticism of this system, see Lizbeth M. Morris, Mandatory Custody Mediation: A Threat to
Confidentiality, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 759 (1986).
234. Cf Sonenstahl v. L.E.L.S., 372 N.W.2d 1,6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (a group of employees
sought to overcome the mediation privilege on the grounds that the mediator had expressed willingness
to testify on the group's behalf).
235. See supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text
236. See infra notes 239-244 and accompanying text
237. See statutes cited supra at note 222.
238. A mediator may attempt to conditionally waive the privilege to allow for party disclosures
if the parties agreed not to subpoena the mediator. It is questionable whether a court would uphold
the condition once the waiver is made given the strong policy of obtaining all relevant evidence for
trial.
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Bifurcated-Holder Statutes: Another approach to addressing the differing
interests of the mediator and mediation parties with respect to disclosure of
mediation information has been to bifurcate holder rights. Such statutes recognize
that party disclosures should be solely within party control, free of mediator
interference. Equally important, mediators are given the means to avoid
testimony. A few states have enacted statutes with bifurcated holder
compelled
9
23

rights.

The Washington statute is an example of the bifurcated model. 24 0 The
privilege is waived as to party disclosures if all the parties agree in writing.24'
The mediator has no control over party disclosures. Mediator disclosures,
however, require the joint consent of the parties and the mediator.242 The effect
of the statute is that a mediator may not disclose confidential mediation
information24 without party approval, nor may the parties compel mediator
testimony. 243
Bifurcated statutes fulfill the critically important function of protecting the
mediator from being the forced "tie-breaker" witness.2 " While parties may not
compel mediator testimony under a bifurcated statute, their loss is limited. Parties
who agree to disclosure may themselves testify freely as to what was said and
done at the mediation. At the same time, each party as an independent holder of
the privilege may block both party and mediator testimony. Bifurcated
provisions properly balance the interests of preserving mediator neutrality and
providing parties with significant control over the disclosure of mediation
information.
E. Information Covered by the Privilege
As pointed out earlier,245 the mediation process is exemplified by wide
ranging, candid negotiation discussions unrestricted by formal rules of procedure
or evidence. Parties to mediation discuss known and new information, present
pre-existing writings and tangible evidence, and prepare written materials for and
during the mediation. Communication often ranges far beyond the core of the
specified dispute. Private personal or business information may be disclosed. A
party may admit or threaten criminal behavior or harm to those present or to
others. One party may perpetrate a fraud on another or the mediator may engage

239. See statutes cited supra at note 223.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.60.070(1)(a) & (2)(a) (1994).
240.
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(a) (1994).
241.
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(2)(a) (1994).
242.
243. All of the bifurcated statutes allow the mediator to testify only with party approval. OR.
REV. STAT. §36.205(3) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(2)(a) (1993); 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a) & (b)
(1994); Hyman, supra note 6, at 72, § (4)(b)(l). The federal administrative dispute resolution
provision allows parties to alter the neutral's rights regarding disclosure, if the neutral is advised of
the parties' wishes before the commencement of the proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 574(d) (1994).
244. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text.
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in wrongdoing. A policy issue emerges as to what mediation information ought
to be privileged. A mediation privilege statute must strike a reasoned balance
between general confidentiality for mediation discussions and access to specific
information deemed by public interest to require disclosure.

1. General Definition of Mediation Information to be Privileged
The usual statutory scheme is a broad general definition24 6 of information
to be covered by the mediation privilege, followed by a list of specific
exclusions.247 With few exceptions mediation privilege statutes cover oral and
written communications24 and information generated by both the mediator and
the parties. Although entirely appropriate, only a couple of statutes specifically
cover the "acts"249 or "conduct" 25 0 of the parties during mediation. A few

246. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (1994) ("[c]ommunications made, material created for
or used and acts occurring during mediation.. . "); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1152.5(a)(1) & (2) (West
1994) (".. . evidence anything said or of any admission made" and documents ".. . prepared for the
purpose of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, the mediation"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)
(Supp. 1993) ("... any mediation communication or any communication provided to in confidence to
the mediator or a mediator organization, .. ."); FLA. STAT. § 44.102(3) (1994) (".. .all oral or written
communications"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 856 (1994) ("[a]ny communication made during the
resolution process . . . "); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-606 (1988) (". . . any communication made in the
course of the mediation"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §328-C:9 (Supp. 1993) ("[a]ll communication, oral
or written"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014 (1992) ("any matter disclosed"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02 (1994) ("... any information discussed or presented in the mediation process..... "); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a) & (b) (1994).
247. See infra part VI.E.2.c. FLA. STAT. §§ 44.102(3) & 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994); OR. REv.
STAT. § 36.205 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.60.070 (Supp. 1994). The Alabama rule takes the
unusual approach of extending confidentiality broadly, but then enumerates only four types of
information that may not be introduced as evidence. The rule could be interpreted to limit the
privilege to those four (admittedly rather inclusive) subject matters: 1) party's views on settlement
proposal; 2) admissions by a party; 3) mediator proposals and views; and 4) statements regarding
willingness to settle. Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11. Of course judicial interpretations of
the application of the mediation privilege in particular cases will shape the privilege.
The Texas statute is also unusual. It has no exclusions other than for otherwise discoverable
material. If the privilege conflicts with "other legal requirements for disclosure" the court is to decide
in camera whether the information is subject to disclosure. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
154.073(d) (West Supp. 1994).
248. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(k) (1994) (".
any communication or document, including worknotes ..... ). The federal administrative dispute
resolution provision also protects information expressly intended to be confidential and information
shared under circumstances that create a reasonable expectation of non-disclosure). 5 U.S.C. § 571(7)
(1994). But see, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11 (1993) (which appears to limit that state's privilege
to oral communications ("anything said" or "admissions made")); Maine Administrative Orders of the
Supreme Judicial Court, Rule B.5. (ADR pilot project covers only "... conduct, discussions, and
statements.").
249. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B) (1994).
250. FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (1994).
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statutes state no exceptions to the privilege.2"' These absolute privilege statutes
override obvious needs for access to certain mediation information.S 2
The general definition of information to be privileged is narrowed in some
statutes by limiting phrases, such as communications which are the "subject matter
'
communication which "relates to the controversy being
of the mediation,"253
'254
or "confidential communications" as defined,25 or by requiring
mediated"
communications to be in the presence of the mediator.2 56 To their credit, such
statutes focus the mediation privilege on communications most in need of
protection (those at the core of the dispute), yet allow "extraneous" information
to remain available to the adversarial process. The weakness of these statutes is
the lack of predictable application.
257
Determining the "subject matter" of a given mediation is problematic.

251. Alabama Civil Court Mediation Rule 11; MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 233, § 23 (West 1986)
(absolute as to information "within the subject matter of the mediation"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.014
(1992) (absolute except for otherwise discoverable evidence); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney
1992); R.I GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.01(3) (Supp. 1994) (family
disputes).
252. See infra Part VI.E.2.
253. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986) ("relating to the subject matter of any
mediation."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 494.02 (West 1990) ("subject matter of the dispute."); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 435.014(2) (1992) ("subject matter of such disputes"); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.073 (West Supp. 1994) ("subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute"); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-31b-7 (1992) (same as Texas); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992) ("subject matter of the
resolution made").
Statutes limiting the privilege to the subject matter of the "agreement" or "resolution" raise the
unfortunate and unnecessary question of whether communications in mediations that do not result in
agreement or resolution are privileged. IOWA CODE § 679.12 (1987) ("subject matter of an
agreement"); MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.1557 (7) ("subject matter of the resolution"); N.Y. Jun. LAw
§ 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992) ("subject matter of resolution").
254. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992); WIS.
STAT. § 904.085(3) (Supp. 1994) ("communication relating to a dispute in mediation").
255.
The Wyoming statute defines confidential communications to be those "... not intended
to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the mediation
process or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." WYO. STAT. § 143-102 (Supp. 1994).
256.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:355 (1991) (extends the privilege to "communications between a
");MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, §23C (West 1986) (communication
mediator and a party ....
"made in the presence of the mediator."). Although the mediator is generally present when parties
communicate, these statutes appear not to offer confidentiality to communications between parties when
the mediator steps out of the room. Similarly, Idaho's mediation privilege similarly limits
confidentiality to communication "among the client, the client's mediator, and persons who are
participating in the mediation, . . . including members of the client's family." IDAHO RULE OF
EVIDENCE 507(C)(2). These provisions raise the question as to whether having a non-party or nonspecified person present during mediation communications destroys the privilege. The theoretical basis
for such a position lies in the traditional privileges which are waived if communications are not made
in confidential circumstances. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at § 74.
257.
This language is problematic for it is often difficult to determine the precise scope of
mediation discussions. For example, in the mediation of a divorce, is a party's disclosure of tax fraud
part of,mediating a property settlement or disclosure of substance abuse part of developing the
parenting plan? Statutes with this narrowing language unnecessarily create the potential for litigation
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There are no pleadings in mediation and considerations of legal relevancy do not
apply.258 Moreover, "extraneous" information is likely since mediators urge
parties to move beyond their legal rights and consider interest-based, often nonlegal, solutions to the conflict.25 9 Take, for example, a dispute over draws by
business partners. Will the privilege include admissions by one partner of making
unauthorized draws, marital infidelity and drug use, or disclosures by the other
partner of diverting partnership assets to another business and personal income tax
evasion? Because answers to these examples are not apparent, the "subject matter"
definition does not serve the mediation process well.26 ° As with Evidence Rule
408 in the negotiations context, the "subject matter" definition results in
uncertainty and invites post hoc determinations of confidentiality.26 '
The Washington statute initially throws a blanket of privilege over all
mediation information,

"...

any communication made or materials submitted in,

or in connection with, the mediation proceeding ... ,62 and then sets out
specific exclusions. Under such statutes with a broad definition of privileged
information, parties begin mediation knowing all their mediation communications
will be confidential, except for specific types of information that can be identified

within litigation when a party seeks to introduce such mediation communications in a subsequent

proceeding.
The same issue arises regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege. See WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at § 2310. A legal client cannot be expected to know in advance what
information is necessary and material to his legal question, and he should not be hampered in seeking
advice. However, when the client knowingly departs from the purpose of seeking legal advice and
interjects irrelevancies, he is no longer communicating under the protected purpose. Colman v.
Heidenreich, 381 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. 1978) (client telling lawyer that client's friend had committed crime
for which someone else was being prosecuted and sued civilly "did not concern the rights, liabilities,
or other legal problems of the ...

client. . . ."); accord, Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677 (Md. 1992);

Registered Home Builders, Inc. v. Lanchantin, 198 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
258. Query: How does a mediator explain the bounds of confidentiality under such statutes in
the mediator's opening statement?
259. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
260. Brown, supranote 3, at 318. A somewhat analogous issue arises with regard to information
relating to the attorney-client relationship. Under the ABA Model Code of professional responsibility,
differing standards of confidentiality applied depending on whether the information was a"confidence"
shared by the client in direct communication with the attorney or a "secret" of the client the attorney
became aware of during the course of the representation from a source other than the client. ABA
MODEL CODE OF PROF. REsP. DR 4-101. Because of the confusion caused by that dual standard, the
newer Model Rules impose a single, global duty of confidentiality on lawyers as to "all information
relating to the representation, regardless of its source."

ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT,

Comment [5] to Rule 1.6.
261. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
262. WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.070(1) (Supp. 1994). Use of the terms "communications" and
"materials," rather than "statements" or "writings" is aimed at ensuring the privilege extends to
nonverbal communication and any tangible items other than writings. Any ambiguity as to conduct
could be eliminated by the phrase used in the Arizona statute: "acts during mediation." ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994). If the definition of privileged information is specifically enlarged

to include acts, then it is important that an exemption be added for "threatened or actual violence that
occurs during mediation." Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss1/4

38

Kirtley: Kirtley: Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation:
The Mediation Privilege
1995]

in advance. A broad definition provides needed improvement over the limitations
of Evidence Rule 408.263 Mediation participants benefit from the certainty such
statutes provide. As will be seen immediately below, a "laundry list" of
exceptions to the mediation privilege has been enacted or suggested. With
confidentiality so critical to mediation's success, 2"4 exceptions must be
judiciously employed.

2. Exceptions to the Privilege
a. PreexistingInformation
Mediation occurs after the events precipitating a dispute. During mediation
preexisting facts, statements,265 documents and tangible objects are often
presented. The availability of such information to the mediation process is
critically important. A privilege rule covering such preexisting information
encourages party candor. However, other policy considerations weigh in favor of
not extending the privilege to otherwise discoverable facts and documents.266
While the mediation process needs privilege protection to function effectively,
the privilege should not permit mediation to become a blackhole into which parties
can purposefully bury unhelpful evidence.267 For example, a party's admission
during mediation that he falsified accounting records would be privileged, but his
placing the records on the mediation table should not make the records privileged.
Allowing discovery of preexisting facts and documents that are presented in

263. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part III.
265. During mediation oral statements made before the mediation are recounted. For example,
a mediation party might state that at the time the automobile accident occurred his passenger said:
"Watch out, the light's red!" The passenger's original statement would never be privileged, for unlike
writings and tangible objects, oral statements once made (absent recording) do not have a continuing
existence. Since the original statement cannot be presented during mediation, in the manner a preexisting writing or tangible document can, the original statement of the passenger does not have the
protection of the mediation privilege and can be sought in discovery. The driver's recounting the
passenger's statement during mediation is a separate, independent and privileged statement
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
267. Hyman, supra note 4, at 32. That would be the expected result with statutes that do not
have an exception from the mediation privilege for otherwise discoverable evidence. Washington's
privilege for dispute resolution centers specifically expresses that concern in stating protection will not
be given to materials " . . . submitted by a participant to the center for the purpose of avoiding
discovery of the material in a subsequent proceeding." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992). That
language unfortunately links discoverability of materials to proof of the submitting party's state of
mind.
Conversely, a party submitting helpful preexisting information during mediation should not be
barred from introducing that information as evidence in a future court action. That result would occur
if the other party refused to consent to its disclosure because the fact or document was part of the
mediation.
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mediation is consistent with traditional privilege268 and evidence269 law. The
Washington statute 21 contains a representative example of ag exception for
"otherwise discoverable" evidence found in several state privileges. 2 " These
statutes follow the correct course by leaving the litigation discovery process
undisturbed.
This approach however causes concern for unwary parties27 2 who tell or
show "it all" during mediation. Such persons are unlikely to understand the
distinction between privileged communications and the later discoverability of
disclosed facts and preexisting documents. 2" The concern is that unscrupulous
parties will use mediation, where candor is urged and confidentiality promised, as
an informal discovery devise. But barring discovery based on clues obtained
during mediation would entwine former mediation parties in litigation to determine
whether the source of the discovery lead came from or was independent of the

268. The attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communication made as a part of
the professional relationship. The privilege does not bar independent inquiry into the same facts that
were communicated to the attorney. STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 1.24 (citing Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
269. FED. R- EVID. 408 does not require the exclusion of otherwise discoverable evidence merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note
4, at 107.
270. The Washington privilege does not apply "[w]hen the written materials or tangible evidence
are otherwise subject to discovery ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(l)(b) (Supp. 1994).
271.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(C) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(4) (Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(k) (1994); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 435.014(2) (1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(2)(c) (1993); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §
154.073(c) (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(1)(a) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.22(iii) (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(t)(b) (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 1-43103(c)(iv) (Supp. 1994).
The Symposium Model accomplishes the same result by limiting the privilege to documents that
were "prepared for the purpose of or in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation .... " Hyman, supra
note 6, at 71, § 1(f). The federal administrative dispute resolution provisions contain both the
definitional and "otherwise discoverable exclusions."
5 U.S.C. §§ 571(5), 574(0 (1994).
The Wisconsin statute exception reads: "[the privilege] does not prohibit the admission of
evidence otherwise discovered, although the evidence was presented in the course of mediation." Wis.
STAT. § 904.085(4)(c) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). This provision could be read to suggest
evidence discovered before and submitted in the mediation is admissible, but post-mediation discovery
is not permitted.
272. Many mediation parties are unrepresented or do not have counsel present during mediation
sessions. They may not understand, particularly after a mediator has said the session will be
confidential, that mediation disclosures of preexisting facts and documents can result in their use by
the other party in later litigation if otherwise discoverable.
273. "While the overall objective of the mediation is to allow the clients to reach an agreement
that is mutually acceptable, clients have to understand that mediation is occurring in an adversary
context, and things said in mediation may lead to discovery of admissible evidence if the case does go
to trial." DIsPuTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1994, 5 (Interview with Attorney
John R. Van Winkle, chair-elect ABA Section of Dispute Resolution [hereinafter Interview]).
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mediation.27 The benefit is not worth the cost. Moreover, such a policy would
be inconsistent with other privileges that do not protect facts, but only confidential
communications.275 By carefully explaining the nuances of confidentiality,
mediators can reduce the chances that mediation will become an informal
discovery devise for unscrupulous parties. Nonetheless, mediation disputants and
their counsel need to be aware of the consequences before divulging discovery tips
during mediation discussions.276
One form of otherwise discoverable mediation information merits privilege
appraisals,
protection. In anticipation of mediation, parties may solicit preliminary to
provide
financial statements or expert opinions. This material is obtained
"ballpark" information for mediation negotiations."" Washington and a few
states278 maintain the privileged status for materials "prepared specifically for use
28 0
Such
in mediation and actually used279 in the mediation proceeding.
statutes are consistent with the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine. 2 1 Only on very narrow grounds does the work-product doctrine allow
282
Mediation's goals
discovery of the facts and opinions of consulting experts.
of encouraging informal, prompt and cost effective settlement are served if parties
are not yoked with these preliminary estimates in later litigation.

274. Minnesota's privilege statute for community dispute resolution programs may cause such
litigation by stating that the privilege "... shall not preclude the use of evidence obtained by other
independent investigation." MINN. STAT. § 494.02 (1990).
275. The attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communication made as a part of
the professional relationship. The privilege does not bar independent inquiry into the same facts that
were communicated to the attorney. STONE & TAYLOR, supranote 204, § 1.24 (citing Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
276. Interview, supra note 273, at 5.
277. Since mediation and litigation proceed simultaneously it may be difficult to determine the
precise motive in obtaining such information. Hyman, supra note 4, at 28. For practical suggestions
on dealing with this issue see infra note 278.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(A) (1994) ("materials created for... a mediation");
278.
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(2)(c) (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(3)(c) (1992); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.22(iii) (Michie 1992). To avoid proof problems and preserve the privilege as to such
materials, a clear paper trail should be created. Correspondence requesting such information should
specifically state that the request is for "mediation purposes" and all documents/reports obtained should
be headed: "Prepared For Use in Mediation Proceedings Only." Note neither statute covers oral expert
opinions obtained and shared in mediation: "I called an engineer and he said it would cost us $200,000
to retool to make the changes you want" The engineer could be deposed.
279. Presenting the material during mediation to the other party or the mediator ought to satisfy
the "actually used in" requirement. The result is not so clear if the material is only shown to the
mediator in caucus or relied on by a party but not presented. Since the purpose of this provision is
the encourage mediation parties to negotiate on the basis of preliminary reports, any use of the material
related to the mediation should satisfy the requirement. Further a literal reading of the "actually used
in requirement will cause needless later proof problems, since there will be no formal record of the
mediation session. The Arizona privilege does not appear to require actual use during mediation.
ARIz. REv. STAT. A N. § 12-2238(A) (1994) ("created for or used ... during a mediation").
280. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(b) (Supp. 1994).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
281.
282. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
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b. PartyAgreements and the Privilege
Parties usually begin a mediation by entering into a written agreement to
mediate.283 Among other things, an agreement to mediate outlines the process,
describes the mediator's role and sets forth the participants' understanding
regarding confidentiality.2" 4 Without an exemption to the privilege, such
agreements remain confidential communications. This is despite the fact that
mediation participants may need access to the agreement to mediate in order to
demonstrate that the privilege was triggered,2"5 to evidence participation in a
mandated mediation,286 to establish the terms of the mediator's undertaking or
to prove a prior agreement to disclose otherwise privileged material. The
Washington statute287 and a few other statutes 88 have an exception for the
agreement to mediate.
Settlement agreements present special considerations. Some parties are
attracted to mediation out of the desire to preserve the privacy of their settlements.
Yet, in certain cases, such as product liability and enviromental cases, secret
settlement agreements may do harm to third parties28 9 or the public at large.29

283. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
284.
At the onset of the mediation process, the vast majority of participants will want the
maximum confidentiality allowed by the applicable mediation privilege (if any). However, parties may
agree in advance, perhaps at the suggestion of the mediator, to waive the privilege as to specific subject
matters. This occurs when the parties, the mediator or the mediation organization believes certain
subject matters ought to be disclosed, but the privilege statute does not have an exception for that type
of information. The Washington statute promotes such decision making by the participants by
removing the privilege "[wihen a written agreement to mediate permits disclosure;. . ... " WASH. REV.
CODE § 5.60.070(l)(c) (Supp. 1994). The public interest is not harmed by allowing parties knowingly
to forego the privilege. See supra part VI.E.2.C. for a list of subject matters which could, but are not
always, excepted from the mediation privilege.
285. See supra note 152, for statutes which trigger the operation of the mediation privilege on
the existence of an agreement to mediate. While the Oregon and Missouri statutes are triggered by a
written confidentiality agreement between the parties, there is no exemption for its disclosure. OR.
REV. STAT. § 36.205 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.014 (1992).
286. Access to the agreement to mediate may not be critical for this purpose. Mediators, while
reluctant to discuss the progress of a mediation, will inform outsiders that a party is participating in
mediation. Cf, The identity of a lawyer's client is generally not privileged. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 9, at § 2311. An exception, known as the last link rule, is when disclosure "may well be
the link that could form a chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime."
Baird v. Koemer, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960).
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(c) (Supp. 1994).
287.
288.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(2.5) (Supp. 1993); 5 U.S.C. § 571(5) (1994).
289.
Such a risk is recognized in the Wisconsin mediation privilege which provides: "In an
action or proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation, the
court may admit evidence otherwise barred by this section if necessary to prevent a manifest injustice
of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of protecting the principle of confidentiality in
mediation proceedings generally." WIS. STAT. § 904.085(e) (Supp. 1994).
290. Access to settlements may be necessary to assure public safety. See, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.600(2) (Supp. 1994) (forbiding a court from entering a sealed order or judgment that conceals
a "public hazard.").
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Also, parties may need access to their settlement agreement for enforcement

purposes.

"
' Certain states
Few statutes contain exceptions for settlement agreements.29
except settlement agreements from the privilege unless the parties otherwise agree
in writing.292 The Washington statute states that the privilege does not apply
"[w]hen the written materials consist of a written settlement agreement or other
agreement signed by the parties resulting from a mediation proceeding." 293 The
Washington statute facilitates enforcement of mediation accords. However, parties
lose control over the secrecy of their written settlements. Those that desire
privacy must limit themselves to oral agreements with their attendant proof
problems. Despite undercutting party privacy, the Washington rule strikes the
correct balance. Maintaining confidentiality of settlement agreements is not
essential to the workings of mediation. Moreover, the public's oversight interest
in citizen disputes is served by allowing access to mediation settlement
agreements.

c. Subject Matter Exceptions
Among the most difficult policy choices in crafting the mediation privilege
is deciding what particular classes of information should be excepted from the
privilege in all instances.294 The process mirrors the analysis involved as to
whether a mediation privilege is warranted. 29 ' As to each type of information,
the cost of the loss of evidence to the justice system must be weighted against the
benefit of a broad-based mediation privilege.296
A "laundry list" of subject matter exceptions has been enacted in various
states or suggested. Examples include: (1) admission of threats to commit child

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(2.5) (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993);
291.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(e) (Supp. 1994); Wis.
STAT. § 904.085(4)(a) (Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. § 571(5) (1994). With the exception of the Oregon
statute, these provisions except only written settlement agreements.
292. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-302(2.5) (Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(1) (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1992).
293. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(e) (Supp. 1994). The "or other agreement" language in
the Washington statute is intended to account for partial, interim settlement agreements. Id. See also,
Wis. STAT. § 904.085(4)(a) (Supp. 1994).
294. This was clear from the reporting of the discussions of the panel members who created the
Symposium Model. Hyman, supra note 4, at 33-34. Disagreement existed as to what exceptions are
appropriate. Id. While panel members believed the conflict to be between the interests of parties and
providers of mediation services, I would add the interests of the public and the courts to that mix. Id.
295. See discussion supra at Part V. Quantifying the costs and benefits with regard to a specific
type of information is not less difficult than with the mediation privilege as a whole. Faced with
balancing immeasurables, reference to exceptions associated with traditional privileges is instructive.
They represent expressions of shared social values and give guidance to policy for the mediation
privilege.
296. Id. Innumerable real and hypothetical circumstances can be imagined where the lack of
access to certain mediation information in that particular case may cause an injustice. But as with the
law, one bad mediation result can make for bad mediation privilege exceptions.
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a crime,2 98

abuse, 29'

a felony,' 99 physical/bodily harm,3"°

[Vol. 1995, No. I
and damage

to

property; "' (2) information pertinent to a crime,"°2 an action claiming fraud
or suits against the mediator;30 3 (3) information relating to the commission of
a crime during mediation, and (4) use of mediation information for research
purposes or non-identifiable reporting.3" In addition, some privilege statutes
permit disclosure when mandated by another statute 30 5 or a court.30 6 For
3

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO R. EVID. § 507; UTAH CODE
§ 78-31b-7(4)(a) (1992); Wis. STAT. § 904.085(4)(d) (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 1-43-

297.
ANN.

103(c)(iii) (Supp. 1994).
298. FLA. STAT. § 723.038(9) (Supp. 1994) (mobile home park lot tenancy mediations); WYO.
STAT. § 1-43-103(c)(ii) (Supp. 1994) ("communication involves the contemplation of a future crime
or harmful act").
299. COLO. REV. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (Supp. 1993).
300. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (Supp. 1993) ("intent to . . . inflict bodily harm");
IDAHO R. EVID. 507(4)(D); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(4)(b) (1994) ("If the ADR provider
determines a participant in the procedure has made an immediate threat of physical violence against
a readily identifiable victim or against the provider, communications involving the threat are not
confidential.").
The Washington privilege for community dispute resolution centers excepts threats to "the
301.
property of a party to the dispute, to the extent the communication may be relevant evidence in a
criminal matter." WASH. REv. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992). The "relevant evidence in a criminal matter"
language raises the question of whether the intent is to allow disclosure if the threat meets the elements
of a crime or only in the event the property destruction actually occurs and criminal charges are
brought.
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(1) (Supp. 1993) (includes juvenile violations).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(d) (Supp. 1993) ("action alleging willful or wanton
303.
misconduct of the mediator or meditation organization"); FLA. STAT. § 723.038(9) (1991) (fraud); FLA.
STAT. § 44.102(4) (Supp. 1994) (mediator disciplinary proceedings); IDAHO R. EVID. 507(4)(E); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 31-04-11(1), 31-04-11(2) (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.205(2(b) (1989); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(4)(a) (1991) (".. . subsequent action between ADR provider and a party..
•for damages arising out of the mediation"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22(ii) (Michie 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 5.60.070(l)(g) (Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. § 574(i) (1994).
304. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(5) (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 44.201(5) (Supp. 1994);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(4)(d) (1992); 5 U.S.C. § 574(h) (1994).
305.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(c) (Supp. 1993); IDAHO R. EVID. 507(4)(D); WASH.
REv. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(d) (Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a)(3), (b)(4) (1994) (mediator only to
disclose if no other person is reasonably available). The "other statute" exception can serve as a brake
on listing numerous specific exceptions within the mediation privilege. In the case of the Washington
statute, the "other statute" exception became the means of accommodating those whose clear preference
for a statute maximizing the scope of mediation confidentiality and not weighed down with numerous
exceptions, and those who wanted to add various specific exceptions, particularly dealing with abusive
situations. The fact that Washington provided by statute for disclosure of child abuse, for example,
satisfied those wanting a specific exception for child abuse in the privilege statute.
If the other statute is a general reporting requirement for all individuals, then the mediator's
obligation is clear. However, if the other statute requires only specified persons to report information
(e.g. physicians/child abuse), the obligations of the mediator are unclear if "mediators" are not among
those listed. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1994).
306. The Texas statute establishes a procedure for courts to consider, in camera, conflicts
between privileged ADR information and "other legal requirements for disclosure." TEx. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(d) (West Supp. 1994). See infra notes 355-358 for discussion (such
a rule has the potential for generating frequent litigation, and subjects the mediation privilege to a
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purposes of the analysis that follows, the various exceptions have been organized
in the categories of past criminal activity, ongoing or future crimes and threats of
harm, and breakdowns in the mediation process and enforcement of mediated
agreements.
i. Past Criminal Activity
Above it was argued that the mediation privilege ought to apply in all
criminal cases.30 7 For the same reasons, admissions of past criminal activity
made during mediation should not be excepted from the privilege.30 ' As pointed
out above, excepting admissions of past criminal activity would eliminate
programs mediating criminal cases and stifle mediation communications in other
types of disputes.30 9
Admissions of past criminal activity do not necessarily present current or
future risks of harm.3" 0 Such an approach is consistent with the treatment of
confidential disclosure of past criminal activity under traditional privileges.3 "
Undoubtedly, because of that body of law, most mediation privilege statutes do not
exclude disclosures regarding past criminal activity.312 Mediation disclosures
involving ongoing or future plans to do crime and threats of harm require separate

analysis.

balancing test unwarranted in most instances).
307. See supra notes 197-202 for discussion.

308. A different result, fueled by constitutional considerations, is likely if a criminal defendant
seeks mediation information to offer in her defense. Cf State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (requiring a mediator to testily, in the absence of a privilege, where the defendant
claimed self-defense based on the victim's threats during mediation).
309. Brown, supra note 3, at 317. A criminally accused person's constitutional rights may be
implicated if he or she is directed to mediation by a court, not given any warning about the rights
against self-incrimination, and thereafter the court receives evidence of the accused person's admissions
made during mediation. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V & XIV.

310. Cf. Hyman, supra note 4, at 38-39 (discussing limiting Symposium Model to future and
ongoing crime). An alternative that has been suggested is to preserve the privilege for disclosures of
criminal activity subject to the right of acourt to override the privilege in special cases where the need
for the information is great. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 4, at 116.
311. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 6.4.10 (West 1986) (as to lawyer-client
privilege); STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 6.09 (as to clergyman-penitent). Cf United States
v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the marital communications privilege did not
apply to a bedroom conversation between husband and wife in which a criminal conspiracy was
planned).
312. However, North Dakota excepts from its privilege evidence related to a crime or a juvenile
violation. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(1) (Supp. 1993).
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ii. Ongoing and Future Crime; Threats of Harm313

The few mediation statutes providing for disclosure of criminal activity
generally limit the exception to ongoing or future crime.314 Such exclusions are
consistent with some views of the attorney-client privilege; society does not wish
to allow individuals to seek out the assistance of a lawyer in planning or carrying
out a crime." 5 However, the other privileges generally do not have an exception
for ongoing or future crimes.3 16 In mediation, where the context is a meeting
of persons in conflict, there is substantial risk of retaliatory reporting of mediation
information. For example, an exception that allows a party to report, and the
mediator to be compelled to testify to, the other party's use of drugs, illegal
gambling, welfare misreporting or not paying income taxes is not warranted. The
risks such offenses present to individuals or society do not justify penalizing
mediation candor.3" 7 On the other hand, an exclusion aimed at "serious physical
harm" is a justified policy choice.
Public policy favoring disclosure of otherwise privileged information is
nowhere stronger than in the area of abuse of vulnerable persons such as children,
the aged and persons with a disability. In most states statutes exist requiring the
reporting of knowledge of abuse or neglect of vulnerable persons to a designated

313. Traditional privileges do not provide an exception for threats of damage to property. Yet
a few mediation statutes allow disclosure of such information. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992).
While not to be minimized, threats to property do not merit disclosure at the cost of sacrificing
mediation confidentiality. The absence of exemptions for threats of injury to property in the clear
majority of statutes reflects concurrence with that judgment
314. .COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (Supp. 1993) ("intent to commit a felony, inflict
bodily harm, or threaten the safety of a child"); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.050 (1992); WYO. STAT.
§ 1-43-103(c)(ii) (Supp. 1994) ("communication involves the contemplation of a future crime or
harmful act"); Hyman, supra note 6, at 72, §§ 4(a)(3), (b)(3). The exception is the North Dakota
statutes which does not limit its exclusion to future or ongoing crime. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(1)
(Supp. 1993).
315. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2298; WOLFRAM, supra note 311, § 6.4.10. See
also Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(l) which allows attorneys to disclose
client confidences or secrets the attorney reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from
committing "a crime." But see, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b)(1) which allows
disclosure only for future crime "likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
316. Disclosures relating to crime are not excepted from the marital privilege unless the activity
involves a crime to the other spouse or a child of the couple, or criminal activities engaged in jointly
by the spouses. STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 5.13; see also Marashi, 913 F.2d at 724
(holding that the marital communications privilege did not apply to a bedroom conversation between
husband and wife in which a criminal conspiracy was planned). As to the clergyman-penitent
privilege, see STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 6.09. Disclosures of crimes to a physician remain
privileged unless the physician is a "partaker" in the crime or acted on behalf of the criminal.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 2385. But see STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 204, § 7.24
(indicating that a number of states have limited the physician-patient privilege to civil cases or provide
for an exception for serious crimes).
317. Cases interpreting FED. R. EVID. 408 suggest that evidence from negotiations of a civil
matter will not be admissible in a later criminal proceeding. ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 4, at
110-11. See also U.S. v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1984).
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governmental agency, even if learned during a confidential interview.3" 8 That
position is consistent with the law governing traditional privileges where the risk

of injury is serious.319 The interests of mediation confidentiality are not so
unique as to justify a different result.32 ° It is not surprising that the most
common exclusion in mediation privilege statutes is for information relating to

child abuse. 321 The same result is reached in states, including Washington, with

an exception allowing for disclosure of information "when mandated by

statute."322

Few mediation privilege statutes allow for disclosure of threats of physical
harm made during mediation.323 Most of these statutes limit the exception to
credible threats of serious bodily harm or violence.324 Such exceptions allow
23
a mediation participant who is so threatened to take protective measures . " A
more troublesome question arises when the threat is directed toward a nonparticipant of the mediation. Does the mediator have a duty to warn the third
party or notify the police of the threat?

318.
319.

See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (1994).
See supra notes 315-316 and accompanying text.

320. But see, C.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (in which a priest accused
of child molestation was granted an injunction barring the parents of the child from disclosing
information from the med/arb proceeding).
321. See supra note 297 for a listing of statutes. An abuse exception that requires reporting of
past behaviors, where there is no perceived risk of future harm, for some represents a roadblock to

experimental mediation with abusers. Some say there is need for a setting where people, whose
relationships includes a history of abuse, can talk to amediator with privilege concerning abuse and
neglect issues. For example, experimental mediation programs exist for parties in court cases involving
alleged abuse or neglect of children. For such programs to function the exception would need to be
limited to present or future risk to a vulnerable person.
322. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(3) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(d) (Supp.
1994).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(D) (1991) ("threatened... violence"); COLO. REv.
323.
STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (1991) ("intent to.. . inflict bodily harm, or threaten the safety of a child");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(4)(b) (1991) ("If the ADR provider determines a participant in the

procedure has made an immediate threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim or
against the provider, communications involving the threat are not confidential."); WYO. STAT. § 1-43103(c)(ii) (1991) ("communication involves the contemplation of a future crime or harmful act").
324. The purpose of the exception is to advise persons of a serious risk of harm who without
warning would be unaware of the risk. Threats directed at a person attending the mediation but not
present when the threat is made, for example during a caucus, present a similar case. If the threat is
made with the person threatened present the exception allows him or her and others present to report
the information to the authorities. Cf Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1985) where the
court ruled a mediator's written report privileged in a civil case claiming constitutional violations
brought by a mediation party involved in a physical altercation during the mediation.
Most statutes do not except threats to property no matter how credible or serious. However, an
argument exists for an exception allowing disclosure of credible threats to do serious damage to a
substantial property interest. For example, "I will blow up your house ... car." See WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.75.050 (1991).
325. The mediation privilege would in theory block evidence of a threat made in mediation as
a basis for a court protective order in the absence of an exception of the type under discussion.
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Applying the reasoning of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California326 to the mediation process, mediators may have an independent duty
to report threats against third persons.327 In that case, a psychologist and others
were sued for failing to inform a third person of death threats made by the
psychologist's client during confidential treatment sessions.328 The client killed
the threatened person. The court held the risk of serious physical injury or death
to an identifiable person created a duty for the professional to warn the intended
victim.32 9 Important to the case was the fact that both the applicable
psychotherapist-patient privilege and professional ethics standards permitted
disclosure by the psychologist under the circumstances presented.330
In response to Tarasoff-like risks in mediation, several mediation privilege
statutes have an exception eliminating confidentiality for threats of serious physical
harm. 33' The absence of such an exception is a weakness of most mediation
privilege statutes, including Washington's.332
A Tarasoff exception for
mediation would eliminate the privilege "when the mediator or a party reasonably
believes that disclosing the mediation communications or materials is necessary to
prevent a mediation party from committing a crime likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily injury to an identifiable person."333 Adding a
Tarasoffexception would implicate few mediations, resolve the Tarasoffdilemma
for mediators and potentially save lives.
iii. Breakdowns in the Mediation Process;
Enforcement of Mediation Agreements

326.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.
327.
Murphy, supra note 4, at 213. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1983) (lawyers may reveal confidential client information the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime likely to cause "imminent death or substantial
bodily harm.").
328. Tarasoff,551 P.2d at 334.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 347.
331.
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(D) (1994) ("threatened ... violence"); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b) (Supp. 1993) ("intent to... inflict bodily harm, or threaten the safety of a
child"); IDAHO R. EVID. 507(4)(D); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 lb-7(4)(b) (1992) ("If the ADR provider
determines a participant in the procedure has made an immediate threat of physical violence against
a readily identifiable victim or against the provider, communications involving the threat are not
confidential.").
332.
WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.070 (1994).
333.
Cf IDAHO R. EVID. 507(4)(D); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1983). Such a provision allows either the mediator or a party to breach confidentiality when
significant injury is probable. Including "party" in the suggested exception allows mediation parties
to report threats to themselves (and identifiable others) to the police and use such threats as a basis for
a protective order. If the mediating parties are familiar with one another, they may have a better sense
than the mediator as to how credible a threat is. Since the threat may occur in caucus and relate to
another mediation party, the proposed exception is not limited to threats against outside third parties.
The provision also covers situations when the threat may have been made during the mediator's
absence.
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As with any dispute resolution mechanism, there will be breakdowns in the
mediation process. Mediators may commit malpractice. Parties may fail to
bargain in good faith. Mediation agreements may be tainted with fraud, or may
be ambiguous or unfair. The mediation privilege should not provide a safe haven
for participant wrongdoing or injustice. However, in allowing for disclosure of
mediation information to deal with serious process breakdowns, care must be taken
not to eviscerate the mediation privilege with exceptions that are too easily called
upon.
A party claiming mediator misconduct must have access to mediation
information and the mediator's testimony. 334 A privilege that bars access to such
information results in de facto immunity for malpracticing mediators. For that
reason, and because the few claims of malpractice likely to arise will not greatly
impact the operation of the privilege, a clear-cut exception to the privilege for
mediator malpractice is appropriate. 33 s The Washington statute336 and a few
other statutes 337 address this obvious need. The Washington statute provides an
exception to the privilege "[iln a subsequent action between the mediator and a
Exceptions for
party to the mediation arising out of the mediation."33
malpractice by mediators would be improved by explicit language permitting
disclosure to mediator licensing authorities as well.339 Mediators also need
access to mediation information to defend themselves against claims and charges,
and to bring suit against parties, usually to collect agreed upon fees. Several
exceptions accommodate such mediator needs for disclosure.34 °
Good faith bargaining is the pathway to mediated settlements. 341 However,

Hyman, supra note 4, at 37-38.
334.
335. Eliminating or limiting mediator liability through immunity provisions is a separate question
that ought to be dealt with directly in the privilege statute or elsewhere. Several state statutes provide
for mediator immunity. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-306 (1993); FLA. STAT. § 44.201(6) (Supp. 1994);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 4, § 18 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. § 583.26 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1805 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-15; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.75.100 (West); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 93.50 (West 1994); WYO.STAT. § 1-43-104 (Supp. 1994).
For a discussion of mediator immunity statutes, see generally, Stulberg, 2 Ohio St. J. Disp.
Resol. 85 (1986) (favoring statutory immunity for mediators) and Chaytink, The Liabilities and
Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environmentfor Model Legislation, 2 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 47
(1986) (opposed to mediator immunity).
336. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.60.070(1)(g), (2)(b) (Supp. 1994).
337. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(2) (1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307(2)(b)

(Supp. 1993) (disclosure permitted for an "action alleging willful or wanton misconduct of the mediator
or mediation organization."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(2) (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
36.205(2)(b) (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(3) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.22(ii)
(Michie 1992); 5 U.S.C. § 574(i) (1994).
338. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(g) (Supp. 1994).
339. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.102(4) (Supp. 1994).
340. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 1b-7(3)(b) (1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070(1)(g) (Supp.
1994).
341. Mediators will often obtain a spoken commitment from each party to negotiate in good faith
at the beginning of the mediation. Moore, supra note 18, at 162. This commitment, while of no legal
force, is available to the mediator as a prod to encourage movement and, in extreme cases, as a basis
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providing an exception to the mediation privilege based on a claim of bad faith
bargaining, short of fraud, is problematic. Most parties undertake mediation
voluntarily. While such parties often negotiate under a mediator's entreaty to
bargain in good faith, they may discontinue negotiations at will. When parties
mediate voluntarily, mediation discussions should not be revealed based on a claim
of bad faith negotiations. Negotiating in bad faith is often in the eyes of the
beholder. Stonewalling or moving in small increments may be justified in
particular mediations.342 Parties who become frustrated by their opponents'
bargaining tactics have the option of withdrawing from the mediation and pursuing
other means of resolving the dispute.343
A different approach is justified when mediation parties come to the table
involuntarily and under a statutory obligation to bargain in good faith, such as in
labor mediation,344 farmer/creditor mediation345 and mandatory child custody
mediation.346 In such cases, mediation communications are essential evidence
to prove or defend against a claim of bad faith bargaining. Mediation
communications should be available in contexts when parties have a statutory
obligation to bargain in good faith, established standards of good faith bargaining
exist and bargaining in bad faith is actionable. For example, in a school
district/teachers' union mediation, if one side bargains in bad faith, mediation
communications must be revealable to an administrative judge or court in order
to obtain or oppose the requested relief. For that reason, some mediation privilege
statutes eliminate confidentiality for claims of bad faith bargaining in mandatory
mediations347 or simply exclude mediations in which negotiating in good faith
is a legal obligation.34 While in this context parties should be free to introduce
mediation communications to enforce good faith bargaining laws, the mediator
should not be compelled to testify. It was on precisely that issue that the

for terminating the mediation.
342. Stonewalling in mediation negotiations may be perfectly appropriate when the party has
a clear-cut legal right supporting her position.
343.
Parties dissatisfied with the course of mediation negotiations should not be forced to
continue to bargain in order to avoid a claim of failing to negotiate in good faith. Hyman, supra note
4, at 48. Claims of bad faith negotiations in mediation could become standard counts in legal
pleadings as a means of opening up the entire mediation to discovery and admission at trial.
344. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.440 (1991); WASH. REv. CODE § 41.59.120 (1991).
345.
MINN. STAT. § 583.26 (1994).
346.
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.184(2) (1991) (requires divorcing parties with children to
designate in the final decree the resolution process to be followed for any future disputes). If
mediation is selected, a party who "frustrate[s] the dispute resolution process without good reason,"
that is fails to mediate in good faith, is subject to attorneys' fees and costs imposed by the court.
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.184(3)(d) (1991).
347. For example, Minnesota's mandatory farmer-lender mediations in which the parties have
an obligation to meditate in good faith. MINN. STAT. § 583.26 (1994).
348. The Massachusetts and Washington general privileges specifically exclude labor disputes.
See MASs. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23C (West 1986); WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.072 (Supp. 1994). In the
case of the Washington statute, the exclusion was sought by interests that wanted to insure continued
access to mediation information to prove claims of "bad faith" bargaining in labor/management
mediations.
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Macaluso34 9 and other court decisions provided the genesis of the mediation
privilege.' °
Most would agree that mediation settlements tainted by fraud, obtained
through duress or deemed unconscionable"' should not be enforceable. Yet
relatively few mediation privilege statutes address these issues, and those that do
mostly contain only fraud exceptions." 2 This deviation from what might be
expected may reflect the conclusion that fraud, duress and unconscionability are
present in few mediations, and may reflect the concern that exceptions dealing
with those ills will open the mediation privilege to widespread misuse by parties
suffering from "bargainer's remorse." For example, a stated fraud exception to
the privilege could be cited by those unwilling to abide by their mediation
agreements, whether justified or not. Undoubtedly, states without fraud, duress
or unconscionability exemptions, such as Washington," 3 recognize that courts
are likely to be willing to set aside the privilege when presented with viable
contract defenses to the enforcement of a mediation settlement agreement." 4
Once in court, mediation participants who wish to make out a case of fraud, for
example, could seek a priori approval from the judge to present mediation
information.3 55 By hearing the competing claims in camera, the court could

349. Macaluso, 618 F.2d at St.
350. See supra notes 209-214 and accompanying text.
351. The Symposium Model contains an exception permitting any party and the mediator, with
court approval, to disclose mediation communications to "prevent manifest injustice." Hyman, supra
note 6, at 72, § 4(a)(4) & 4(b)(4). The federal administrative dispute resolution provision requires
court approval for "manifest injustice" disclosures by both the neutral and the parties. 5 U.S.C. §§
574(a)(4), (b)(5) (1994). The parameters of the "manifest injustice" exception, if intended to go
beyond disclosure in cases of abuse of vulnerable persons, threats of serious physical injury, fraud,
duress and unconscionability, are vague. The manifest injustice exception has the potential of
swallowing the privilege. As with claims of bad faith negotiations and fraud, a manifest injustice
exception offers an opportunity to upset the privilege by mediation parties experiencing "settlement
remorse." The better approach is to leave the privilege silent on this subject, and allow for judicial
intervention where an enforcement action has been commenced.
352. FLA. STAT. § 723.038(9) (Supp. 1994) (mobile home park lot tenancy mediations); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 679.12 (West 1987) (perjured testimony has been given); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2857 (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (West Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11(1)
(Supp. 1993) ("civil fraud"). From their language, these statutes appear more often to be intended to
apply to disclosures of past or intended fraudulent schemes during mediation, rather than being aimed
at fraud committed during the course of the mediation itself.
353. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070 (Supp. 1994).
Cf Harriman v. Maddocks, 518 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1986) (where the court held that ME' IL
354.
EVID. 408 did not bar testimony of fraud in the inducement of settlement).
355. Texas has such a procedure to resolve conflicts between the privileged ADR information
and other legal requirements for disclosure. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(d) (West
Supp. 1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a)(4), (b)(5) (1994) (court determines if disclosure necessary to prevent
a manifest injustice, help establish a violation of law or prevent harm to the public health or safety).
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preserve confidentiality unless disclosure was held to be necessary and
Since the parties will be able to present evidence related to
appropriate. 56
fraud, duress or unconscionability, mediators should not be compelled to testify
as the "tie-breaking" witness. 3 " A similar approach is appropriate when
interpretive issues arise regarding the meaning of a settlement agreement." 8

VII.

CONCLUSION

Mediation has proved to be a highly successful process of resolving disputes.
Recognizing that confidentiality is at the heart of mediation's success and that
existing law inadequately protected the process, many jurisdictions have created
mediation privilege statutes and rules. These provisions vary in their effectiveness.
Certainty of application is a critically important characteristic for mediation
privilege provisions. Certainty is enhanced by statutes and rules that are triggered
by affirmative acts (written agreements to mediate or court orders) or directed
toward readily identifiable classes of mediations (those under a specific statute or
mediated by specified organizations).
Broad-based protection for mediation communications is preferable. A
jurisdiction-wide, single mediation privilege statute or rule serves that purpose.
Localities with a series of narrow privilege provisions leave areas of mediation
practice without privilege protection. Moreover, multiple privileges of varying
substance create confusion and the potential for litigation when a given mediation
arguably falls under more than one provision. Diversity in mediation practice
settings can be accounted for in a single, all-encompassing privilege by allowing
parties, the mediator and mediation organizations to alter the terms of
confidentiality by written agreement.
Once a mediation is covered by a privilege provision, all persons with access
to mediation information must be "burdened" by the statute. Also, the protection
of the privilege ought to extend from the first intake interview through file
closing. Privileged mediation information should include all oral and written
communications and conduct that occurs within the mediation proceeding.
Narrowing the protection to information relating to the subject matter of the

356.
The preferred procedure would be for an in camera review of any mediation
communications relied on to prove fraud or "manifest injustice." If a threshold showing was made by
the proponent of the evidence, only then would the court override the privilege and permit discovery
or admissibility of mediation communications.
357. That is the approach of the Minnesota statute. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(k) (Supp. 1994).
The privilege does not apply to the parties in the dispute where there has been an application to the
court to set aside or reform a mediation settlement agreement. Id. See supra notes 209-212 and
accompanying text for a discussion of mediator testimony.
358. Special problems face mediation parties attempting to use mediation information to establish
the meaning of the settlement agreement. For even if confidentiality is waived by the court, the litigant
faces the limitations of the parole evidence rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213

(1981).
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mediation merely replicates the uncertainty of evidence law preceding Rule 408's
promulgation.
The protection of the privilege should extend to civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings.
Mediation discussions will be chilled if the
participants have to be concerned that their communications will be admissible or
subject to discovery in a later legal proceeding. Extending the privilege to later
criminal cases is especially critical for mediation programs that handle cases
diverted from the criminal justice system.
Exceptions to the privilege also have the potential for significantly chilling
mediation discussions. For that reason, exceptions ought to be established
judiciously so as not to hobble the practice of mediation. In balancing competing
policy considerations, the case for disclosure is most compelling where vulnerable
individuals -- children, the aged or disabled -- are at risk or when a credible threat
of serious physical injury or imminent death has been made against an identifiable
person. Other appropriate exceptions are for "otherwise discoverable" evidence,
the written agreement to mediate and any settlement agreement. An "otherwise
discoverable" exception prevents mediation from becoming a "blackhole" in which
to bury unfavorable evidence. The agreement to mediate and settlement
agreements are needed to prove understandings reached by the participants. An
exception is also appropriate to allow disclosure of mediation information if a
dispute arises between the mediator and any of the parties, or a mediator's
professional conduct comes under review by a licensing authority. Nonidentifiable mediation data should be excepted from the mediation privilege for
research or educational purposes.
Jurisdictions may choose to vary their approach to deal with other concerns
arising out of mediation, including fraud, unconscionability, "manifest injustice,"
public health and safety issues, or violations of law. Privilege statutes without
exceptions for these issues implicitly create a role for the courts of setting aside
the privilege in appropriate cases. Other localities may wish to address these
matters with specific exceptions to the privilege. Regardless of the approach
taken, if a court becomes involved in resolving such questions the appropriate
procedure to preserve confidentiality is an in camera hearing. Disclosure should
not be ordered unless the court finds a need of sufficient magnitude which
outweighs maintaining the integrity of the mediation for the participants and the
confidence of the public that mediation communications are held confidential.
A final important task for a mediation privilege provision is to establish clear
rules for asserting and waiving the privilege. Differing rules are justified for party
and mediator disclosures. So long as all agree, parties ought to be free to disclose
mediation information. Mediator disclosures are another matter entirely. A
separate privilege and holder status is required for mediator disclosures in order
to preserve party and public perceptions of mediator neutrality. The attractiveness
of mediation will be short lived if the public learns mediators can be forced to
divulge confidential information. A mediation privilege provision with these
characteristics serves mediation participants, the mediation process and the public
interest.
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